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LEGISLATIVE NOTES: 
THE EDUCATI.ON OF ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 
ACT OF 1975 
The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 19751 pur-
ports to confirm a national commitment to full equality of educa-
tional opportunity for the nation's eight million handicapped chil-
dren2 by means of an expanded program of financial a~sistance to 
the states to aid them in the massive court-mandated effort3 to 
provide an education for every handicapped child. This legislation 
commits the federal government to assist the states in meeting the 
direct costs of educating handicapped children. 4 To qualify for 
the federal subvention, an educational agency is required to estab-
lish an individualized educational program5 for every handicapped 
child and to implement a system of procedural safeguards which 
guarantees due process in placement and programming decisions 
'Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Supp. V. 1975)). 
The proposed regulations of the Office of Education pertaining to this Act were published 
for comment on December 30, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,966 (1976). The final regulations were 
scheduled to be promulgated at the end of March, 1977, to become effective October I, 1977. 
The manuscript of this Note was completed prior to the publication of the proposed 
regulations. An effort has been made to take account of the provisions contained in the 
proposed regulations in the relatively few instances where they have either shed additional 
light on the substance of the 1975 Act or raised unforeseen difficulties. For the most part the 
proposed regulations have merely incorporated the language of the Act. For this reason it is 
not expected that the final regulations will have a substantial impact upon the analysis and 
conclusions of this Note. 
'The Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped placed the number of handicapped 
children between birth and age twenty-one in 1974 at more than eight million. H.R. REP. No. 
332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I I (1975); S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975). The 
Bureau estimated that I. 75 million handicapped children were receiving no educational 
services in 1974, while another 2.5 million were receiving "an inappropriate education." 
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess 11 (1975). 
The term "handicapped children", as amended by the 1975 Act, includes "mentally 
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotion-
ally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with 
specific learning disabilities who by reason thereof require special education and related 
services." 20 U .S.C. § 1401(1)(Supp. V 1975). The categories of handicap enumerated in the 
statutory definition are defined in the Proposed Regulations, § 12 la.4, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,977 
(1976). 
3See notes 7-23 and accompanying text infra. 
•see notes 61-68 and 98-117 and accompanying text infra for consideration of the 1975 
Act's funding provisions. The estimated cost to the federal government of the program, if 
fully funded, would be approximately $3.1 billion per annum by fiscal 1982. 121 CONG. REc. 
Hll,348 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975). This is roughly ten times the amount appropriated for 
fiscal 1977 ($315 million). Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, 
Appropriate Act, 1977, Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1427. It has been 
estimated that state and local expenditures on the education of the handicapped in 1972-73 
totaled $3.2 million for slightly more than three million handicapped children. Hearings un 
H.R. 70 Before the Select Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and 
Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 31 (1974). 
5See notes 89-93 and accompanying text and Part V A infra. 
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and provides a grievance mechanism that includes the right to bring 
a civil action. 6 
This note discusses the principal provisions of the 1975 Acl as 
they relate to the developing law of the educational rights of hand-
icapped children. These provisions are considered from two 
perspectives: their operational meaning or effect on the implemen-
tation of educational programs for handicapped children, and the 
role they may play in future legal efforts to obtain an education for 
every handicapped child appropriate to his or her special needs. 
The note is divided into five sections. Part I reviews the land-
mark judicial decisions which have established the right of hand-
icapped children to participate in free, public education. The basic 
provisions of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975 are then presented in Part II. The funding provisions are 
discussed in Part III with particular emphasis upon the tension 
between the promise of federal largesse and the expense of com-
pliance with statutory and judicial requirements. Part IV reviews 
prior efforts to obtain judicial recognition of a substantive right to 
an appropriate education and suggests some ways in which the 
1975 Act may alter the framework of judicial consideration of this 
endeavor. Finally, Part V examines in detail the Act's provisions 
for individualized educational programs and procedural 
safeguards. The utility of these provisions to persons who seek to 
hold educational agencies accountable for their special education 
programs is stressed. In addition, particular attention is paid to 
certain legal problems that are likely to emerge from the implemen-
tation of the complaint procedure incorporated into the 1975 Act. 
I. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE HANDICAPPED 
CHILD'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
Mandatory special education for all handicapped children ac-
quired constitutional momentum in the early 1970's when two 
federal courts indicated that the exclusion of handicapped children 
from public education could be a denial of their constitutional 
rights to equal protection and due process. In Pennsylvania As-
sociation for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 7 [P.A.R.C.] a 
class action on behalf of mentally retarded children excluded from 
the public schools as uneducable or untrainable, a three-judge 
federal court approved a consent decree in which the parties 
6See notes 94-97 and accompanying text and Part V B in/ra. 
7343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
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agreed that all mentally retarded children were capable of benefit-
ing from a program of education and training. 8 The public school 
officials were required to place each mentally retarded child in "a 
free, public program of education and training appropriate to the 
child's capacity .... " 9 The court found that the labeling of a child 
as mentally retarded imposed a serious stigma; 10 therefore, it con-
cluded that full due process protections must be afforded to the 
child before such a label could be imposed by the school. 11 
The principles enunciated in P.A.R.C. were extended to all 
handicapped children in Mills v. Board of Education. 12 The court 
held that no handicapped child could be excluded from a regular 
public school assignment unless the child was provided "(a) 
adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's 
needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and 
(b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of 
the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational 
alternative." 13 The District of Columbia was ordered to provide 
each child of school age "a free and suitable publicly-supported 
education regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical or 
emotional disability or impairment." 14 A constitutional basis for 
this obligation was found in the principle expounded in Brown v. 
Board of Education 15 that ''where the state has undertaken to 
provide [the opportunity of an education, that opportunity] is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms." 16 By 
denying handicapped children access to publicly-supported educa-
tion, the District of Columbia had violated the due process 
clause .17 The school system's defense of insufficient funds was 
rejected on the ground that the District's interest in educating the 
excluded children outweighed its interest in preserving its financial 
resources. 18 If sufficient funds were not available, the court said, 
then the available funds must be expended in such a manner that no 
child would be entirely excluded from a publicly supported educa-
tion .19 
8Id. at 307. 
"Id. 
10Id. at 293. 
"Id. at 303-04. 
12348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
13/d. at 878. 
••Id. 
15347 u .s. 483 (1954). 
16348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972), quoting 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis 
deleted). 
17348 F. Supp. at 875. 
18/d. at 876. 
'
9/d. 
FALL 1976] Education of Handicapped Children Act 113 
Despite some well-reasoned concern regarding the precise scope 
and precedential value of P.A.R.C. and Mills, 20 these decisions 
served as a springboard for the vigorous assertion of the constitu-
tional right to education for all handicapped children. Three fun-
damental propositions from these cases have served as the under-
pinnings of the asserted right to education. First, the equal oppor-
tunity principle enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education 21 will 
be applied to the practice of excluding handicapped children from 
public education. 22 Second, identification, classification, and 
placement of handicapped children must be accompanied by full 
procedural due process safeguards. 23 The P.A.R.C. decision also 
embraced an educational notion that has become a vital corollary 
of the equal protection principle. The court found that every hand-
icapped child could benefit from some type of education or train-
ing. 24 As a result it was no longer necessary to show that the 
20Handel, The Role of the Advocate-in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an 
Effective Minimal Education, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 349, 357 n.45 (1975); Comment, The Hand-
icapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637, 694 n.39 
(1967); Hearings on H.R. 70 Before Select Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 227, 229 (1974) (testimony of J. Stanley Pottinger, 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice). 
Neither case involved a full-scale trial on the merits. In P.A.R.C. discussion of the 
plaintiffs constitutional claims was limited to a jurisdictional determination of the existence 
of colorable claims of constitutional violations. 243 F. Supp. at 279, 283 n.8, 293-97. In Mills 
the court breifly addressed the constitutional issues after the defendants failed to fulfill an 
interim stipulation and consent order. However, since the District of Columbia did not 
dispute its obligation to provide education for handicapped children but simply pleaded 
insufficient resources as a defense, 348 F. Supp. at 866,871, 875-76, the court's discussion of 
equal protection was limited to demonstrating the applicability of this principle to the denial 
of education for the handicapped. 348 F. Supp. at 866, 875. 
Despite the concerns over their value as legal precedents, P.A.R.C. and Mills have been 
frequently treated as representing judicial recognition of the handicapped child's right to a 
public education. See, e.g., Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitu-
tional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SyRACUSE L. REV. 995, 1008 (1972); McClung, 
Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?, 3 J.L. 
& Eouc. 153 (1974); see also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975). 
21 347 u .s. 483 (1954). 
22This principle appears in both P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 297, and Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 
875. Commentators have also used the Brown principle as their point of departure in arguing 
for the right to education of handicapped children. See, e.g., Dimond, The Constitutional 
Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973); SCHWARTZ, The 
Education of Handicapped Children: Emerging Legal Doctrines, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 
125 (1973). 
23Once again the decisional position of P.A.R.C. and Mills made it uncertain whether the 
full complement of procedural safeguards obtained in the opinions were constitutionally 
required. The courts in both cases approved sets of procedures previously agreed to by the 
parties which included prior notice, a trial-type hearing, rights to counsel, presentation of 
evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, impartial hearing officer, and a written decision 
based upon the record with the burden of proof on the educational agency. Pennsylvania 
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 304-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972); 
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972). ·in neither instance, 
however, did the court expressly state that handicapped children were entitled to all of these 
procedures as a matter of constitutional right. See note 40 infra for a fuller consideration of 
the constitutional question left open by P.A.R.C. and Mills. 
24 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 (E.D. 
Pa. 1972). 
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handicapped child could fit into the existing educational program; 
rather the program had to be tailored to the child's needs. 
A. Equal Protection 
Following the breakthrough created by P.A.R.C. and Mills, 
counsel and commentators fashioned a broad spectrum of argu-
ments designed to buttress and expand the basic principles enun-
ciated in those cases. Perhaps the greatest effort and attention was 
devoted to the application of equal protection to the condition of 
handicapped children. Even after P.A.R.C. and Mills the exclusion 
of handicapped children continued, and advocates were therefore 
anxious to invoke the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection 
analysis, knowing that few discriminatory classifications could 
withstand judicial application of this standard. 25 
1. Suspect Class - The contention was made that handicapped 
children qualified as a "suspect" class because they were a vulner-
able and stigmatized minority, lacking in political power and fre-
quently subject to discrimination. 26 Consequently, it was argued 
that legislative classifications that caused the suspfct "handicap-
ped" category to be invoked, for example, statutory exceptions to 
compulsory attendance laws, should be subjected to strict scrutiny 
and overturned if found to constitute invidious discrimination. 27 
This argument has met with some success in the courtroom. 28 
2. Fundamental Interest - Advocates have also sought to 
employ the other catalyst of strict scrutiny, "fundamental inter-
ests." It was believed that the Supreme Court's statement in 
Brown v. Board of Education that "[t]oday education is perhaps 
25The strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis is discussed in.Developments in 
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV .. L. REv. 1065 (1969).. 
Typically, compulsory school attendance laws have excepted children thought to be 
uneducable or otherwise unfit for schooling. The plaintif(s in P.A.R.C. successfully chal-
lenged Pennsylvania's statutory exclusions by producing expert evidence that all mentally 
retarded children were capable of benefiting from a program of education and training. 
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 (E.D. Pa. 
1972). With this showing, the rationality of the legislative classification of handicapped 
children was undermined and their continued exclusion became an arguable denial of equal 
protection. Id. at 297. 
Because the P.A.R.C. decision took the form of a consent decree the court did not feel 
obliged to decide whether strict scrutiny standards would apply to the education of hand-
icapped children. The court was satisfied that the plaintiffs had established a colorable claim 
even under the less stringent rational basis test of equal pfqtection. Id. at 283 n.8. 
""Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 ~XCEPI"IONAL CHILDREN 119, 
(1973); Dimond, supra note 22, at I 100-02; Wald, The Right to Education, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS 
OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 833, 836 (1973). 
27 Dimond, supra note 22, at I 100-02. 
28See In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974). See also Colorado Ass'n for Retarded 
Children v. Colorado, No. C-4620 (D.Colo., filed Dec. 22, 1972) (handicapped persons may 
constitute a "suspect class"). 
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the most important function of state and local governments" 29 
provided a foundation for the claim that education was either a 
constitutional right.or at least a fundamental interest that could not 
be denied in the absence of a compelling state interest. 30 But in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 31 the Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, holding instead that education per se 
was neither a constitutionally guaranteed right nor a fundamental 
interest. 32 
3. Rational Basis - Although Rodriguez was a setback for the 
proponents of equal educational opportunity for handicapped chil-
dren, the "minimum rationality" standard of traditional equal pro-
tection33 proved sufficient to propel handicapped children through 
the school house door. The courts in both P.A.R.C. and Mills had 
found it unnecessary to venture beyond "minimum rationality" 
standards to uphold the plaintiffs' claims. 34 The critical factor that 
rendered the exclusionary provisions vulnerable to attack was the 
judicial acceptance of the proposition that, regardless of the type 
and severity of handicap, all children could benefit from some form 
of educational program. Upon acceptance of this proposition the 
exclusion lost it justification, since the distinction drawn in the 
compulsory education statutes between handicapped and nonhand-
icapped children lacked a rational basis. Administrative and fiscal 
excuses might still be offered for the continued exclusion of hand-
icapped children from public education, but these arguments had 
already been answered in Mills. 35 Hence, ariy states that excluded 
29347 U.S. at 493. 
30See, e.g., Comment, Equality and the Schools: Education as a Fundamental Interest, 
21 AM. U.L. REV. 716 (1972). 
3
'411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
32Mr. Justice Powell's opinion denied that education was a constitutional right on two 
grounds. He rejected the argument based on Brown with the observation that "the impor-
tance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as 
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection clause." 411 U.S. at 
30. Recognizing that the right to education was not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, he then considered whether it was implicitly guaranteed by virtue of its relationship to 
"the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 
right to vote." 411 U.S. at 35. This contention was also rejected. 411 U.S. at 36-37. 
33See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 25. 
34S ee note 20 supra. 
35See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. This is not to say that the courts have 
arrived at a wholly satisfactory solution to the problems created by limited fiscal resources. 
In Mills the court insisted that the school district fund special education programs even if 
that meant an overall reduction in the level of per pupil expenditures throughout the system. 
Yet. courts have been reluctant to mandate an "equal dollars" standard of equal educational 
opportunity. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975). One 
course of action may be to require the state to provide additional funds to assure an adequate 
educational program for handicapped children. A similar action nas been taken in the area of 
desegregation remedies. In Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), the District 
Court on remand from the Supreme Court ordered the State of Michigan, which had .been 
found guilty of ~egregative acts, to pay at least half of the added costs of certain "educa-
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handicapped children from its program of free, public education 
would be accused of violating the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
B. Procedural Due Process 
Due process demands arose initially with respect to the testing 
and classification practices used to exclude individuals from school 
or to-place them in special education programs. A series of reports 
and cases detailing the misclassification of educationally disadvan-
taged and non-English speaking children as mentally retarded led 
to proposals for due process safeguards. 36 Similar demands were 
voiced with respect to the labeling and placement or exclusions of 
the genuinely handicapped. 37 
In P.A.R.C. and Mills the courts approved procedures designed 
to protect the due process rights of handicapped children. These 
safeguards included: 38 
(a) written notice of the proposed action, with specification of 
the reasons therefor, including all relevant data; the right to 
an impartial hearing before an impartial hearing officer if the 
parents object to the action; 
(b) access to all pertinent records and to independent diagnos-
tic services; 
(c) right to counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 
and to present evidence; and 
(d) a decision by the hearing officer based solely upon the 
tional components'.' that the District Court included in the desegregation remedy. 540 F.2d 
at 241. In upholding this order the Court of Appeals explained that "[s]ince Michigan State 
officers and agencies were guilty of acts which contributed substantially to the unlawful de 
jure segregation that exists in Detroit, the State has an obligation not only to eliminate the 
unlawful segregation but also to insure that there is no diminution in the quality of educa-
tion." 540 F.2d at 245. Spokesmen for handicapped persons may well argue that without 
adequate funds to operate special education programs appropriate to the needs of handicap-
ped children these children will be as effectively deprived of their rights as are children who 
have been subject to segregation and who now face the prospect of a reduced educational 
program in order to pay for the costs of desegregation. If a court accepts the analogy 
between segregation and exclusion, it may conclude that without funds for adequate special 
education programs the right of access to the public school system is being frustrated. 
The Education of AU Handicapped Children Act of 1975 represents the congressional 
response to the predicament of school districts caught between an overstrained fisc and 
judicially supported claims of handicl!lpped children to a ~•full service" education. 
36Dimond, supra note 22, at 1090-91; Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional ani:l 
Policy Implications of Student Classifications, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1973). See Larry P. 
v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Diana v. State Board of Education, C-70-37 
RFP (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 5, 1970) (consent decree, June 18, 1973); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff d sub nom. Smuck v. Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
37Schwartz, supra note 22, at 130-33. 
38Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania 
Ass'n for Retarded Children_ v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
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evidence presented, with the burden of justification on the 
educational agency. 39 
117 
Following the P.A.R.C. and Mills orders approving the full 
panoply of procedural safeguards, advocates maintained that these 
provisions were required to protect the "liberty" interest of hand-
icapped children in light of the stigmatization inherent in classifica-
tion as handicapped and to protect their putative "property" inter-
est in a free, public education. 40 
39The remarkable congruence of the due process provisions in P.A.R.C. and Mills is 
marred only by a discrepancy with respect to the burden of proof. lnP.A.R.C. the Amended 
Stipulation states that a "proposed change in educational status shall be approved only if 
suggested by substantial evidence on the whole record of the hearing" but that introduction 
by the educational agency of an official report recommending the change "shall discharge its 
burden of going forward with the evidence," thereby requiring the parent to introduce 
evidence. 343 F. Supp. at 279,305 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Arguably, the burden of persuasion has 
also been shifted to the child and his parents by this language. Compare Mills, which 
expressly provides that the defendants (i.e., the educational agency) "shall bear the burden 
of proof as to all facts and as to the appropriateness of any placement, denial of placement, 
or transfer." 348 F. Supp. at 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972). 
•
0See, e.g., Wald, supra note 26, at 837; Schwartz, supra note 22, at 128-29; Dimond, 
supra note 22, at I l I l-12. 
While the purpose of the present discussion is to sketch the legal developments that 
presaged congressional enactment of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 
leaving until later sections the analysis of the legal issues, a few words are in order at this 
point concerning the constitutional dimensions of procedural due process as applied to the 
admission, classification, and placement of handicapped children. As indicated in note 23 
supra, the P.A.R .C. and Mills courts did not pass on whether the extensive procedural 
safeguards incorporated in their orders were constitutionally required to assure fundamental 
fairness. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which considered the question of the 
process due students suspended from school for ten or fewer days, both the majority and 
dissenting opinions doubted that the education area was an appropriate place to inject a full 
panoply of trial-type procedural safeguards. Id. at 578, 583; id at 590-91 (Powell, J. dissent-
ing). See also, Kirp, Procedura/ism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 
ST AN. L. REV. 841 (1976). Although the Court recognized that the extent of the process due 
is contingent upon the significance of the possible deprivation of liberty or injury to property 
interests, 419 U.S. at 572-76, it imposed only what it called "rudimentary precautions 
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school." Id. 
at 581. These "rudimentary precautions" simply required "in connection with a suspension 
of IO days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charge against him 
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence ... and an opportunity to present his 
side of the story." Id. The Court expressly abjured mandating full trial-type safeguards in 
this situation. Id. at 583. 
On a broader plane the Supreme Court has been reluctant recently to stretch the due 
process clause to the limits reached a few years earlier. Compare Hortonville Joint School 
Dist. No. Iv. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482 (1976), Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 
(1976), Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh. denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976), and Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S .. 433 (1971), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Whether 
this represents a wholesale retreat, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J. dissent-
ing), or merely the principled application of the due process calculus, it does indicate that, 
depending on the circumstances, handicapped children may be entitled as a matter of 
constitutional law to fewer procedural safeguards than either the advocates or the P.A.R.C. 
and Mills orders would suggest. 
The uncertainties regarding the constitutional dimensions of due process only serve to 
emphasize the significance of the 1975 Act in this•area. The Act mandates as a condition for 
financial assistance the implementation of the full range of procedural safeguards adopted in 
P.A.R.C. and Mills. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). See Part V B 3 infra. 
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C. Right to Education 
A third constitutional claim is the substantive right to an effec-
tive education. 41 Although its appearance in the education of the 
. handicapped area has been limited thus far to a few ~ases involving 
tuition grants to private schools42 and educational programs for the 
institutionalized handicapped,43 this claim may become the basis 
for considerable legal conflict in the near future. 44 
The notion that underlies this position is that the right to educa-
tion is meaningless unless the programs are responsive to the 
special needs of handicapped children. The legal foundation for 
this claim has not been fully developed, although its basic outlines 
are visible. Rather than attemping to specify educational content or 
techniques, proponents have sought to establish that a substantive 
right to an effective education is implicit in present law. For exam-
ple, one advocate has drawn upon the intimation in Rodriguez of a 
right to a minimum education to support the claim of handicapped 
children to an education that is appropriate to their needs. 45 Others 
have built their claims to an effective education upon state con-
stitutional or statutory provisions that assure educational oppor-
tunities for all. 46 Regardless of the legal theories employed, how-
ever, the courts will be asked to rule that the right to education for 
handicapped children necessarily requires educational agencies to 
provide programs that are appropriate to these children's needs 
and that meet those needs effectively .47 
II. THE EDUCATION OF ALL HANDICAPPED 
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975 
A. Prior State and Federal Legislation 
Education in the United States has traditionally been regarded as 
41The issue of the scope and nature of.the right to an education is broader than the· issue, 
discussed in Part I A 2, of whether any such right is a "fundamental interest." 
42See, e.g., In re Held, Docket Nos. H-2-71 and H-10-71 (Family Court, Westchester 
County, New York, Nov. 29, 1971); Kivell v. Nimointin, Civil No. 143913 (Sup. Ct. 
Fairfield County, Conn., filed July 18, 1972). Both of these unreported cases are collected in 
L. BURRELLO, H. DEYOUNG & L. COLEMAN, A COMPILATION AND REVIEW OF LITIGA-
TION AFFECTING THE HANDICAPPED 202-03 (N .D.) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHI-
GAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM). 
43See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971), 334 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 
1972). 
44The legal bases for asserting such a claim and the impact of the 1975 Act on these-
assertions are more fully discussed in Part IV. 
45 Handel, supra note 20, at 363. See also Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an 
Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974). 
46See McClung, supra note 20, at 166-72. 
47The eligibility and state plan requirements in the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975 as vehicles for asserting the claim to an appropriate education are examined in 
Part V B 2 infra. 
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a responsibility of the states. In keeping with the critical socializing 
role assigned to education forty-nine states have enacted compul-
sory education laws of one form or another. 48 In addition, numer-
ous state constitutions guarantee basic educational rights to their 
citizens. 49 Notwithstanding these provisions, however, handicap-
ped children have often been excluded from public education by 
virtue of exceptions to the compulsory attendance laws. 50 A few 
states had developed alternative programs for some categories of 
handicapped children at an early date. Yet as recently as 1971, a 
year prior to the P.A.R.C. and Mills decisions, only seven states 
had adopted mandatory education legislation that included all 
handicapped children, while twenty-six additional states had man-
datory programs for one or more catergories of handicaps. 51 
Involvement of the federal government in the education of hand-
icapped children commenced in 1966 when Title VI was added by 
amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) of 1965.52 Title VI established a grant program "for the 
purpose of assisting the states in the initiation, expansion, and 
improvement of programs and projects (including the acquisition of 
equipment and where necessary the construction of school 
facilities) for the education of handicapped children. " 53 In 1970 a 
separate Education of Handicapped Children Act was enacted to 
replace the ESEA's Title Vl. 54 The basic thrust of the program, 
however, remained the development of educational resources and 
the training of personnel. 
After P.A.R.C. and Mills legislative efforts intensified on both 
the state and federal levels. Spurred by an increasing number of 
court actions, virtually every state enacted some form of mandat-
ory special education legislation. 55 Meanwhile, Congress began 
consideration of an expanded program of federal assistance. The 
effort first bore fruit in the Education of the Handicapped Amend-
ments of 1974.56 The new provisions evidenced the impact of 
recent adjudication on congressional attitudes. For the first time 
48Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 
supra note 45, at 522 n.9. 
49 f. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON, & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW AND EDUCATION OF 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ) I (1971). 
•
0Jd. at I 1-12. 
51 H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975). 
52 Pub. L. No. 89-750, § I 6 I, 80 Stat. I 204 (I 966), amending Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 
(1965). 
53 Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966). 
54 Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 175 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970), 
amending Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title VI, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966) ). 
55See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, Table 2 (1975). 
56 Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title VI,§§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 579; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Supp. IV 
1974), amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970). 
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each state was required to establish a goal of providing full educa-
tional opportunities for all handicapped children as a condition for 
receiving a grant under the Act. 57 As a further prerequisite for 
eligibility, the Amendments required procedural safeguards pat-
terned on those in P.A .R .C. and Mills. 58 In an effort to assist the 
states in meeting their constitutional and statutory obligations to 
provide educational opportunities for all handicapped children59 a 
new entitlement formula was adopted that geared payments to the 
number of children aged three · to twenty-one inclusive in the 
state. 60 
B. The 1975 Act 
Despite the significant boost given to education of the handicap-
ped by the 1974 amendments, that legislation was viewed as an 
interim measure by congressional supporters.61 Subsequent legis-
lative history revealed two major sources of dissatisfaction: in-
adequate funding of the state aid program, and the slowness of the 
states in implementing court-mandated equal educational oppor-
tunities for the handicapped.62 It was suggested that the federal 
government would have to assume a much larger share of the cost 
of ·educating handicapped children if the states were to be able to 
provide the educational programs to which the millions of hand-
icapped children were legally entitled. 63 Supporters recognized 
that increased financial assistance alone would be insufficient to 
speed implementation and that compliance mechanisms would also 
have to be tightened. 64 
The legislation that eventually emerged as the Education of All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 was responsive to these con-
gressional concerns. In an endeavor to provide financial assistance 
to the states in amounts commensurate with the growth of special 
education programming a new grant formula was developed. Be-
ginning with fiscal year 197865 a state would be entitled to receive 
5720 U.S.C. § 1413(12)(A) (Supp. IV 1974). 
5820 U.S.C. § 1413(13) (Supp. IV 1974). For a discussion of the safeguards provided by the 
1975 Act see Part V B infra. 
••s. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1974). 
60 A state would be entitled to a maximum amount equal to $8. 75 for every child aged three 
to twenty-one in the state. This formula was initially adopted in 1974 for fiscal 1975 only 
(Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 614, 88 Stat. 580). The 1975 Act extended the application of this 
formula through September 30, 1977 (Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 2(a), 89 Stat. 773). 
61 H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975). 
62H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975); 121 CONG. REc. H7,764 (daily ed. 
July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Miller). 
63See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1975). 
64 121 CONG. REc. H7,764 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Miller). 
65 Fiscal year 1978 begins on October I, 1977, and ends September 30, 1978. For the fiscal 
periods from 1975 through September 30, 1977, a maximum entitlement for each state of 
$8. 75 times the number of children aged three through twenty-one in that state was retained. 
See note 60 supra. 
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an amount of money equal to the number of handicapped children 
aged three to twenty-one receiving special education multiplied by 
a percentage of the average per pupil expenditure in public schools 
in the United States during the second preceding year. 66 The per-
centage figure would escalate from 5 percent for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 1978, to 10 percent in the next fiscal year, 
and then by 10 percent steps to 40 percent for the fiscal year 1982 
and thereafter.67 Although the Act contained no specific authoriza-
tions for the years after fiscal 1977, the annual cost for a fully 
funded program under the new formula was estimated to be in 
excess of 3.1 billion dollars by 1982.68 
Congress also took steps to remedy a second source of discon-
tent, the slow pace of implementation of mandatory special educa-
tion programs. It did so by restructuring the application and fund 
disbursement procedures to make each state accountable for the 
compliance of its local educational agencies. A state educational 
agency would screen applications from the local agencies69 and 
then submit a single state application to the Commissioner of 
Education. 70 Disbursement of funds to the state, and through it to 
the local educational agencies, would be conditioned upon continu-
ing compliance with federal mandates. 71 The burden of monitoring 
local agency compliance would rest with the state agency, 72 with 
the Commissioner empowered to withhold funds from any state. in 
which noncompliance by a local agency was found to exist. 73 The 
intention of the Congress in creating this arrangement was evi-
dently to increase surveillance without an increase in federal man-
power while at the same time creating strong incentives for the 
states to exact compliance. 74 To further insure compliance Con-
gress, as a condition of eligibility for financial assistance, required 
8620 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(l) and (4) (Supp. V 1975). 
6720 U .S.C. § 141 l(a)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975). A significant feature of the 1975 Act was the 
adoption of a "pass through" formula designed to assure that, beginning in fiscal year 1979, 
at least 75 percent of the funds disbursed to each state under the Act would in fact reach the 
local and intermediate school districts that provide most of the educational services for 
handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(c)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
68 121 Cong. Rec. HI 1,348 (daily ed. November 18, 1975). The estimated maximum 
authorization per year under the entitlement formula for fiscal year 1982 and thereafter was 
$3,160,000,000. The 1975 Act also contains a provision for pro rata reduction in the event 
that appropriations fail to match authorizations. 20 U.S.C. § 141l(g) (Supp. V 1975). 
6920 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
7020 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
71 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(I) and (2), 1416(a), 1420 (Supp. V 1975). 
7220 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
7320 U.S.C. § 1416(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
74This incentive is vitiated somewhat by§ 616(a) of the Act (20 U .S.C, § 1416(a) (Supp. V 
1975)) which provides in substance that the Commissioner has the alternatives of making no 
further payments to the state under the program or of limiting payments to the state 
educational agency only for local agencies and intermediate units whose actions did not 
cause or were not involved in the failure. 
122 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10: 110 
each state and local educational agency to establish a complaint 
procedure whereby any person dissatisfied in any respect with an 
agency's special education program might enter a complaint and 
obtain an impartial hearing. 75 This procedure brings problems to 
the attention of state agencies 76 and the Commissioner77 without 
the necessity of mobilizing a corps of federal inspectors. 
The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 contains 
a number of other provisions that promise to have a significant 
impact upon special education programming throughout the na-
tion. 78 For the most part these additions have been characterized 
as efforts to strengthen and clarify provisions enacted in 1974. 79 
Yet, they may well transform the character of special education 
programming. Moreover, they contain the seeds of a major change 
in the legal contest for full educational opportunity for all hand-
icapped children. 80 
These provisions are to be found in three sections of the 1975 Act 
that establish the conditions that must be met by any state or local 
educational agency seeking funds under the Act. The first section 
specifies the criteria for state eligibility to receive federal assis-
tance. 81 Another section requires each state that is seeking funds 
under the Act to submit a plan that details the policies and proce-
7520 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). See Part VB infra. 
7620 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975) provides: 
In carrying out its functions under paragraph (I) [to approve or disapprove applica-
tions of local and intermediate units], each State educational agency shall consider 
any decision made pursuant to a hearing held under section 1415 of this title 
[section 615 of the Act], which is adverse to the local educational agency or 
intermediate educational unit involved in such decision. 
7720 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(7) (Supp. V 1975). 
78 1n addition to·the discussion that follows in the text, see Part V infra, which considers 
several of these in greater detail. 
'"See, e.g .. 121 CONG. REc. S20,429 (daily ed. November 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen. 
Stafford). 
80See Part IV infra. 
81 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. V 1975). Among the most significant criteria of eligibility are: 
(I) ''The state has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free 
appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1975). 
(2) The state has developed a plan which sets forth in detail (A) an established "goal of 
providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children," a timetable for ac-
complishment, and a description of facilities, personnel, and services needed; (B) assurance 
that free appropriate education will be available for all handicapped children aged three 
through eighteen by September I, 1978, and for handicapped children aged three through 
twenty-one by September I, 1980; (C) a scheme for identifying and evaluating all handicap-
ped children in the state, and a "practical method" for determining those who are currently 
receiving special education and those who are not being served; (D) certain administrative 
procedures; and (E) availability of the plan to the community in advance of submission to 
the Commissioner. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
(3) The state has established priorities for special education designed to reach first all 
handicapped children not currently receiving special education, and secondly to assist the 
most severely handicapped. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (Supp. V 1975). 
(4) "The State has established ... procedural safeguards as required by [the Act]." 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (Supp. V 1975). 
FALL 1976] Education of Handicapped Children Act 123 
<lures adopted by the state· with respect to education of the hand-
icapped-and documents the state's efforts in meeting these goals. 82 
Finally, to qualify for payments a local educational agency must 
submit an application to the state educational agency in which it 
provides assurances that the goals and criteria set forth in the Act 
are being met. 83 When read together, the three sections impose the 
following set of requirements. 
By the target date of September 1, 1978, a free, appropriate, 
public education must be available for all handicapped children 
aged three to eighteen inclusive,84 and by September 1, 1980, all 
handicapped children of ages three through twenty-one must be 
served. 85 An affirmative obligation is imposed upon every local 
educational agency seeking funds to identify, locate, and evaluate 
all handicapped children within the agency's jurisdiction.86 The 
Act also requires state and local agencies to give first priority to 
implementing programs and expending funds for handicapped chil-
dren not yet receiving special education.87 The next priority is to 
assist the most severely handicapped within each category who are 
currently receiving an inadequate education.88 
The 1975 Act embraces the notion of individualized educational 
programming designed to meet the unique needs of each child.89 
This is accomplished by means of an "individualized educational 
program" (IEP) which is developed as a cooperative effort be-
tween the local educational agency involved and the child's parents 
or guardians. 90 The IEP must contain a detailed explication of 
educational needs, institutional goals, services to be provided, and 
8220 U .S.C. § 1413 (Supp. V 1975). 
8320 U .S.C. § 1414 (Supp. V 1975). 
8420 U .S.C. § 1412(2)(8) (Supp. V 1975). The Act also contains an incentive grant program 
to encourage the development of special education programs for handicapped children aged 
three to five, inclusive. Each state that provides special education to such children may 
receive a maximum of $300 annually for each such child served, provided the program 
otherwise meets the Act's requirements for eligibility. 20 U .S.C. § 1419(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
8520 U .S.C. § 1412(2)(8) (Supp. V 1975). However, this subsection excepts any state from 
the requirements with respect to handicapped children aged three to five and eighteen to 
twenty-one, inclusive, "if the application of such requirements would be inconsistent with 
State law or practice, or the order of any court, respecting public education within such age 
groups in the State .... " Id. 
8620 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975). 
8720 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1975). See S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
37 (1975). 
8820 U .S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1975). 
The proposed regulations indicate that funds received under the 1975 Act may not be used 
for "secondary priority children" until a free, appropriate, public education is provided for 
all first priority children in the jurisdiction. Proposed Regulations,§ 12la.214, 41 Fed. Reg. 
56,985 (1976). See also the summary discussion regarding "Priorities in the Use of Part 8 
Funds," 41 Fed. Reg. 56,969 (1976). 
89 H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1975). 
90The lEP is defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (Supp. V 1975). The provisions and implica-
tions of the IEP are discussed in Part V A infra. 
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appropriate objective measures of achievement that will permit 
effective monitoring of the child's progress by the educational 
agency and by the child's parents. 91 The IEP of every handicapped 
child must be reviewed and updated at least annually .92 In addi-
tion, the "mainstreaming" of handicapped children, that is, place-
ment in regular classrooms with children who are not handicapped 
whenever possible, is a condition of eligibility for financial assis-
tance under the Act.93 
The 1975 Act spells out in detail the due process provisions 
which every educational agency must implement in order to qualify 
for financial aid. 94 In addition, a complaint procedure is blue-
printed for every participating state and local agency. 95 A parent of 
a handicapped child may complain about any aspect of the educa-
tional program and receive a hearing before an impartial hearing 
officer.96 Any aggrieved party may appeal to the state educational 
agency and finally to a state or federal court.97 
The impact upon special education programming of these provi-
sions in the 1975 Act cannot be gauged precisely since the effect 
will vary from state to state depending in part upon the extent to 
which similar provisions have already been established in response 
to public sentiment or judicial prodding. However, it is possible to 
identify certain broad consequences which are likely to be felt 
throughout the nation. The remainder of this note examines the 
implications of the three major elements of the 1975 Act. 
Ill. FUNDING OF EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED 
The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 repre-
sents a dramatic change in the philosophy of federal assistance for 
the education of handicapped children. Finding that "present fi-
nancial resources [of the state and local agencies] are inadequate to 
meet the special educational needs of handicapped children 
•• , "
98 and recognizing that, as a result of judicial mandates, 
91 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19) and 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975). 
9220 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975). 
9320 U.S.C. §§ 1412 (5)(8) and 1414(a)(l)(C)(iv) (Supp. V 1975). See also H.R. REP. No. 
332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975). 
The proposed regulations set forth rather elaborate requirements for guaranteeing that 
each handicapped child will be educated in what is referred to as the "least restrictive 
environment." Proposed Regulations,§§ 121a.440-.445, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,991 (1976). 
9420 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). These provisions are discussed in Part V B infra. 
9520 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). See Part VB 2 infra. 
9620 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (Supp. V 1975). 
9720 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(2), 1415(c), 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
98The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)(8), 
89 Stat. 775. 
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"massive new sums of money are going to have to be spent, by 
someone, on special education ... , " 99 Congress in the 1975 Act 
committed the federal government to assisting state and local edu-
cational agencies in meeting their responsibilities by providing 
funds to pay a portion of the direct cost of educating handicapped 
children. 100 Under the Act's formula, by 1982, state and local 
agencies will be entitled to receive more than an estimated 3.1 
billion dollars annually for special education .101 However, the 
most sanguine observer must acknowledge that, where federal 
grants are concerned, a significant gap between promise and per-
formance may often appear. Should federal assistance fail to ap-
proach projected levels, state and local educational agencies could 
face additional difficulties in the future. 
During the floor debates on the 1975 Act speakers repeatedly 
voiced the fear that the projected authorization figures recom-
mended by the legislation's sponsors were not only unrealistic but 
would induce expectations on the part of handicapped children and 
their parents that could not be met. 102 After much handwringing 
the Congress decided to retain the authorization figures and the 
entitlement formula on which they were based, because the figures 
represented a "costing-out" of the special education programming 
required by federal and state legislation and judicial decrees. 103 
Supporters acknowledged that federal expenditures in this area 
might be substantially below authorization levels for the foresee-
able future. 104 To remedy this conflict a new subsection providing 
99 121 CONG. REC. HI 1,351 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Michel). 
100 121 CoNG. REC. S20,428 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford). See also 
notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra. 
101 See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra. 
102See, e.g., 121 CoNG. REC. H7,758 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Ashe-
brooke) ("the ultimate in irresponsibility"); 121 CONG. REc. HI 1,351-52 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 
1975) (remarks of Rep. Michel). 
103H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975). 
10
•See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Muskie on the occasion of passage of the Conference 
Report: 
It is the task of the authorizing committees to identify the needs for programs 
such as this .... 
However, the probability that we will fuUy meet these needs seems small .... 
[l]t strikes me as unlikely that we will be able to fund this program at the full 
authorization in the near future .... 
. . . I believe we need to understand clearly that large out-year authorizations, 
such as those included in the bill, do not mean that we will necessarily spend at 
these levels. 
12 I CONG. REC. S20,436 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1975). 
On March I, 1976, the.Ford Administration recommended to Congress a program that 
would consolidate twenty-four educational programs into a single $3.3 billion grant to the 
states for education. See Presidential Message on the Financial A:;sistance for Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, [1976] 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 432. See also N.Y. 
Times, March 2, 1976, at 14, col. 4. The plan would eliminate the categorical grant programs 
for education, including those for the education of the handicapped. Federal funds would bi 
disbursed to the states, which would formulate their own allocation plans. However, ;; 
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for the ratable reduction of allocations should the entitlements 
exceed the appropriated funds was enacted. 105 
Of greater concern than inflated expectations is the prospect that 
the 1975 Act may actually increase the financial problems of local 
and state educational agencies in meeting judicial and legislative 
mandates. Three factors make this result likely. According to con-
gressional estimates, in 1975 approximately 1.75 million handicap-
ped children were not receiving any special education. 106 School 
systems must accommodate these children in the immediate future. 
Also, the 1975 Act restricts the use of aid-to-the-handicapped funds 
to the payment of "excess costs." 107 An educational agency is 
required to expend the same amount per pupil on handicapped as 
on nonhandicapped children before it can allocate federal funds for 
"excess costs." 108 Thus, absent increased local resources the av-
erage per pupil expenditure for all children must decline. 
Moreover, the entitlement formula in the 1975 Act envisions a 
maximum federal subvention of 40 percent of the average per pupil 
cost. 109 Because the education ofa handicapped child is often quite 
expensive 110 the local agency cannot depend on federal assistance 
appears that they· would be required to allocate three-fourths of the funds for the education 
of the poor and the handicapped. See N.Y. Times, March 2, 1976, at 14, cols. 4-5. Even if a 
significant portion of the bloc grant funds were targeted for the handicapped the total would 
not begin to approach the more than 3 billion dollars recommended for the years after 1980 
as necessary to finance a full-service program of education for all handicapped children. 
Further, it must be wondered what effect abolition of the categorical grants would have on 
the compliance machinery installed in the 1975 Act. The fate of any such bloc grant program 
is uncertain due to the advent of a new Administration. 
10520 U .S.C. § 141 l(g)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
106H.R REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., I st Sess. 11 (1975). An additional 2.5 million handicap-
ped children were reported receiving an inappropriate education. Id. See also the "State-
ment of Findings and Purpose" in the I 975 Act for a somewhat different set of figures. Act of 
Nov. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)(4), 89 Stat. 774. 
10120 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1975). The term "excess costs" is defined in the 
1975 Act, 20 U .S.C. § 1401(20) (Supp. V 1975), as 
those costs which are in excess of the average annual per student expenditure in a 
local educational agency during the preceding school year for an elementary or 
secondary school student, as may be appropriate, and which shall be computed 
after deducting (A) amounts received under this subchapter or under title I or title 
VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of I 965, and (B) any State or 
local funds expended for programs which would qualify for assistance under this 
part or under such titles. 
108H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., !st Sess. 13 (1975). In 121 CoNG. REc. HI 1,349 (daily 
ed. Nov. 18, 1975), Congressman Quie state'd: 
[T]o prevent funds from being commingled into the general education budget of a 
local school district, we have mandated that the monex_ served [sic] cover only the 
excess costs involved with educating handicapped children. In this way, a school 
district will have to spend on a handicapped child exactly wh.at it will spend on any 
other child before it can spend one penny of the Federal dollars .... 
•
09See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra. · 
110 The average cost-index is estimated to be 1.9 times the nonhandicapped child's cost. 
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975). 
FALL 1976] Education of Handicapped Children Act 127 
to cover all of the excess cost. Again the local agency will have to 
find additional funds to meet these expenses.U' 
This suggests that many states and localities may be unable to 
provide a full range of educational services for all handicapped 
children with the resources presently available. Moreover, unless 
the states and localities are willing and able to readjust priorities to 
provide significantly more funds for education of handicapped 
children, they could be caught in a vicious circle, chasing federal 
aid to meet constitutional and statutory obligations only to find that 
the funds are insufficient and the use restrictions imposed by the 
federal legislation counterproductive. 
For example, recent judicial decisions provide state and local 
agencies with little choice but to seek out federal funds. Yet, 
federal subventions are not likely to provide sufficient additional 
funds to develop full-service programs for all handicapped chil-
dren.112 The problem is compounded by the terms of the 1975 Act 
which require the Commissioner of Education to cut off 
education-of-the-handicapped funds of any state or locality that 
fails to make available a free, appropriate, public education for all 
handicapped children.11 3 If an agency fails to meet the deadlines of 
the Act it risks losing the funds it must have to meet the goal set by 
both the courts and the 1975 Act. 114 The 1975 Act also requires that 
111One factor could reduce the strain on existing resources in some areas. If an agency is 
already paying the total cost of educating some handicapped children, it may be able to shift 
a portion of the excess costs to the federal program, thereby releasing funds for use in 
serving newly enrolled handicapped children. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975). 
But see the "Comment" to the "nonsupplanting provision" in the proposed regulations, 
§ 121a.109, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,983 (1976), which reads, "in judging compliance with this 
[nonsupplanting] requirement, the Commissiqner looks to see if Part B funds are used for 
any costs which were previously paid for with state or local funds." The clear indication of 
the "Comment" is that 1975 Act funds may not be used to supplant state or local funds even 
though the latter funds were used to cover the excess costs of educating handicapped 
children. Although the requirement that 1975 Act funds shall be used to supplement existing 
expenditures is sensible, it is questionable whether the gloss which the Office of Education 
has apparently placed upon it is consistent with the Act's philosophy of assisting states and 
localities in meeting the excess costs of educating handicapped children. While the interpre-
tation offered in the "Comment" will have the effect of concentrating federal funds on the 
education of previously excluded and inadequately served children, it will prevent the 
reallocation of existing special education funds to meet the "regular" costs of serving these 
children and it will penalize the states and localities that have already developed full-service 
programs for many or all categories of handicapped children. If the 1975 Act is in fact 
intended to assist educational agencies in meeting the excess costs of educating handicapped 
children, then a way should be found to permit reallocations within special education 
budgets while at the same time preventing the use of federal funds as a substitute for local 
revenues. 
112Consider also in this regard the requirement that funds obtained under the Act must be 
used to provide educational opportunities for all handicapped children not presently receiv-
ing special education before any of the funds may be used for the education of handicapped 
children who are receiving less-than-full-service educations. See note 88 supra. 
11320 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(8) and 1416(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975). 
'14The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has been reluctant in the past to use 
the termination of funds as a compliance mechanism. Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforce-
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the educational agency provide an education that is appropriate to 
the handicapped child's needs. 115 This provision reflects the view 
that equal educational opportunity has meaning for handicapped 
children only where the educational program is geared to meet 
their special needs. A state or locality that fails to implement this 
goal may lose its federal subvention.11 6 
· Although the difficulties examined in the foregoing analysis may 
be avoided, they suggest that the repercussions of the 1975 Act 
reach beyond disappointed expectations. Unless the level of ap-
propriations is increased dramatically, the 1975 Act may well be 
regarded not as the culmination of the effort to obtain educational 
opportunities for all handicapped children but as the beginning of 
the struggle to obtain adequate funds.11 7 
me'nt of FederatStandards in Grant-in-Aiil Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involve-
ment, 58 VA. L. REv. 600, 621-29 (1972). 
However, a recent development promises to have a major impact in this area. Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) provides that "[n]o 
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason 
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activitiy receiving Federal financial 
assistance." Failure to comply with Section 504 will result in the denial or discontinuance of 
all programs of federal financial assistance to the offending agency or jurisdiction. Under the 
regulations proposed to implement section 504 many of the basic rights of handicapped 
children that have been identified in court decisions and incorporated into the Education of 
All Handicapped Children Act have been adopted in the sections dealing with elementary 
and secondary education. Proposed Regulations, Subpart D, §§ 84.31-.38, 41 Fed. Reg. 
29,564-65 (1976). Consequently, to receive federal funds for any educational program or 
activity, an educational agency will have to satisfy the requirements set forth in these 
regulations. Proposed Regulations, § 84.31 ,41 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1976). This means that an 
educational agency electing not to participate in the formula grant program of the Education 
of All Handicapped Children Act will not have to meet the conditions of eligibility for the 
receipt of funds under that Act. Nevertheless the agency will not qualify for federal funds 
under any other program by virtue of the requirements imposed under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
The intended linkage between Section 504 and the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act is discussed in the summary comments to the proposed regulations for the 1975 Act. 41 
Fed. Reg. 56,967 (1976). 
11520 U.S.C. §§ 1412(1) and 1414(a)(l)(C) (Supp. V 1975). 
116But see note 114 supra. 
117The enthusiasm of state and local educational agencies may wane further if appropria-
tions remain at or near the fiscal 1977 level. Congress appropriated $315,000,000 for state 
assistance for fiscal 1977. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Appropriation Act, 1977, Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L,. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418. Although 
entitlements will increase annually from October 1978 through 1982, the allocations must be 
ratably reduced to match appropriations. See note 105 and accompanying text supra. For 
example, during the 1980-81 school year the federal subvention will be 30 percent of the 
average pupil cost for each handicapped child served. If the appropriation were limited to 
$300 million, the disbursement per child (assuming 8 million handicapped children) would be 
$37.50. However, the average "excess cost" would perhaps· be more than one thousand 
dollars per handicapped child. (The 1972-73 "estimated average expenditure for handicap-
ped students served" was $776. Financial Assistance for Improved Educational.Services for 
Handicapped Children: Hearings on H.R. 70 Before the Select Subcomm. on Education of 
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1974). This figure 
cannot be equated with "excess cost" but it does give some indication of the order of 
magnitude. For purposes of comparison, the 1972 estimated average public school expendi-
ture per pupil was $930. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 125 (1972). The 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ACT ON JUDICIAL 
RECOGNITION OF THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 
129 
The remainder of this note examines a pair of provisions which 
can be expected to have a significant impact on future efforts to 
provide educational opportunities for all handicapped children. 
The implications of the "Individualized Educational Program" 
(IEP) and the "complaint procedure" provisions will be viewed in 
the context of the legal efforts to maximize educational oppor-
tunities for all handicapped children. 
A. Past Legal Efforts 
Two distinct lines of argument have been advanced in the cam-
paign to achieve full educational opportunities for all handicapped 
children. Each line may be summarized in terms of its dominant 
goals and principles .. The first has been directed primarily at over-
coming the exclusion of handicapped children from public educa-
tion by establishing that a handicapped child is entitled to an equal 
opportunity to receive a publicly supported education where such 
education has been afforded nonhandicapped childrenY 8 To pro-
tect the child's educational rights during classification and place-
ment, the strict application of due process safeguards has also been 
vigorously pressed. 119 This approach has met with remarkable 
success, as is evidenced by the number of recent court decisions 
and state special education acts. 120 
comparable 1975 figure was $1250. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 133 
(1975) ). 
A threshold limitation written into the 1975 Act to encourage program efficiency may 
result in further limitation on available funds. To prevent the spreading of federal funds too 
thinly the Act bars the distribution of funds to any local educational agency that is entitled to 
less than $7500 for the year. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1975). Again assuming a 
limited appropriation which would net $37.50 per handicapped child, no system would 
qualify for federal funds unless it had 200 handicapped children. 
In apparent recognition of the implications of this threshold provision, Congressman 
Perkins commented: 
I wish to make it clear that there is no intention that the benefits of this program be 
denied handicapped children in any local school district because of the $7500 
limitation. That limitation only affects the flow of money. It does not affect the 
extension of benefits. 
The conference report [i.e., the Act] provides great flexibility in how benefits are 
to be accorded handicapped children in this situation - and it may very well be and 
should be that the State will simply return to the local school district Federal 
moneys which would have been available to it except for the $7500 limitation. 
121 CoNG. REc. HI 1,348 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975). 
""See Part I A supra. 
''"See Part I B supra. 
120See Part I supra. 
130 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10: l 10 
The second line of argument is not as well defined. 121 The issue 
is clear: whether a handicapped child participating in the educa-
tional process is receiving an appropriate and effective education. 
That is, merely to remove the legal barriers to education is insuffi-
cient; the educational programs offered must address the special 
needs of handicapped children. 122 However, proponents of this 
view have not been able to agree on a legal theory that will secure 
judicial recognition of the substantive right to the appropriate and 
effective education which they seek. Efforts to advance this posi-
tion have encountered judicial opposition due to the difficulties 
involved in translating the notion of an appropriate and effective 
education into a manageable judicial framework without requiring 
the court to assume the role of an educational policymaker. 123 
Passage of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, with its 
provisions for individualized educational programs and parental 
complaints, may provide advocates with the means for effectively 
expressing the goals and principles of the second line of argument 
in a manner that is acceptable to the courts. 
B. Judicial Barriers to Establishment of 
the Right to an Appropriate Education 
The notion of a right to an appropriate and effective education 
has been used successfully to buttress complaints against the func-
tional exclusion of children who were nominally within the educa-
tional system. Where educational agencies have not provided pro-
grams that take account of factors such as cultural or language 
differences, 124 or where authorities have turned educational 
facilities into little more than human warehouses, 125 this notion has 
made it easier for advocates and judges to apply the equal protec-
tion doctrine even though the children have not been formally 
denied an opportunity to receive ·a publicly supported education. 
However, advocates have been unable to win legal recognition of a 
substantive right to an appropriate and effective education. The 
reasons for this failure can be seen by examining the views of the 
121 Three examples of this line of argument are outlined in subsequent paragraphs of this 
Part. For additional expressions of the basic legal arguments see Part I A 2 and Part I C 
supra. 
122 For a forceful statement of this viewpoint see McClung, supra note 20, at 166-72. 
'
23The grounds for judicial opposition are dealt with at length in Part IV B infra. 
124On cultural differences resulting in misclassification, see notes 32-33 supra: on the 
failure to provide instruction in child's primary language, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 
(1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). 
125See, e.g .. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 
197'2). See also, McClung, supra note 20, at 162-66. 
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courts in Mcinnis v. Shapiro 126 and San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez. 127 
The plaintiffs in Mcinnis alleged that the system of public school 
financing in Illinois violated the equal protection clause by permit-
ting wide variations in per pupil expenditures, thereby depriving 
certain students with greater educational need of a "good" educa-
tion.128 The court noted, however, that in substance the claim was 
"that each pupil is entitled to a minimum level of educational 
expenditures, which would be signficantly higher that the existing 
$400." 129 The court further noted that "[t]he underlying rationale 
of the complaint is that only a financing system which apportions 
public funds according to the educational needs of the students 
satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment." 130 
The court found two major difficulties with this argument. Con-
siderations of educational policy, local autonomy, and lack of 
judicial expertise preclude application of a standard based upon the 
educational needs of students. 131 Furthermore, even if the four-
teenth amendment required that expenditures be made only on the 
basis of the pupils' educational needs, "[t]he only possible stan-
dard is the rigid assumption that each pupil must receive the same 
dollar expenditure. Expenses are not, however, the exclusive 
yardstick of a child's educational needs." 132 Concluding that dollar 
equality could not be the measure of equal protection, 133 the court 
then applied the minimum rationality test to the state's financing 
scheme and found that the scheme did indeed reflect "a rational 
policy consistent with the mandate of the Illinois Constitution." 134 
In Rodriguez the plaintiffs alleged an equal protection violation 
and sought to invoke the strict scrutiny standard by claiming that 
the plaintiffs, as residents of an area with relatively low property 
values, constituted a suspect class and that education was a fun-
damental interest. 135 Although the Court acknowledged that edu-
cation was a matter of paramount concern in modem society, it 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that education merited treatment 
126293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (three-judge panel), affd sub nom. Mcinnis v. 
Ogilvie. ~94 U.S. 322 (1969). 
127411 U.S. I (1973). Both Mcinnis and Rodriguez involved challenges to school financing 
rather than education of handicapped children. Nevertheless, each addressed the claimed 
right to an effective education. 
128Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. at 329. 
129/d. at 331 n.11. 
130/d. at 331 (emphasis in original). 
131 /d. at 336. 
132/d. at 335. 
133/d. at 331 n.11, 335-36. 
134/d. at 336. 
135411 U.S. I, 16-17 (1972). For present purposes the suspect class claim may be disre-
garded; the discussion concentrates on the court's analysis of the fundamental interest 
claim. 
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as a fundamental interest. "[T]he importance of a service per-
formed by the State does not determine whether it must be re-
garded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the 
Equal Protection Clause." 136 The Court concluded that education 
was neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.137 However, while deciding against the fundamental interest 
claim on the facts presented, the Court. seemed to hold open the 
possibility that a complete denial of educational opportunity might 
constitute a denial of equal protection. 138 
Having rejected the fundamental interest argument as presented, 
the Court proceeded to apply the minimum rationality standard and 
found that the Texas scheme of school financing was constitution-
ally sufficient. 139 In reaching that conclusion the Court undertook a 
lengthy explanation of the reasons for subjecting the finance sys-
tem to minimum scrutiny. Mr. Justice Powell cited a number of 
factors as justifications for judicial restraint. These included the 
complexities of fiscal policy, 140 the presence of "the most persis-
tent and difficult questions of educational policy," 141 lack of judi-
cial expertise, 142 and profound questions of federalism. 143 He con-
cluded that "the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing 
on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could cir-
cumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems 
and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions." 144 
Mclnnis and Rodriguez illustrate three barriers to judicial accep-
tance of the right to an effective education. First, there is the 
concern with discoverable and manageable judicial standards 
1361d. at 30. 
1371d. at 35. The plaintiffs-respondents had argued that education was "a fundamental 
personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote." Id. 
1381d. at 36-37. The Court stated: 
Even if it were conceded that some jdentifiable quantum of education is a 
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, 
we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures io Texas 
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might 
have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational 
opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an 
interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending 
levels are involved and where ... no charge fairly could be made that the system 
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills 
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process. 
Id. at 36-37. 
13
"ld. at 40-55. 
1401d. at 41. 
14
'ld. at 42. 
'
421d. at 42-43. 
1431d. at 44. 
1441d. at 43. 
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whenever questions of educational· needs and goals are raised. 
Courts are uncomfortable with the task of making educational 
policy. Nor are they persuaded that they possess the capacity to 
supervise the execution of those policies. Secondly, the courts 
share in the widespread skepticism that equal educational oppor-
tunity can or should be measured in terms of equality of dollars 
spent or the recorded progress of students. 145 Scholars have de-
bated for some years the merits of various needs-outcomes ap-
proaches to educational equality without arriving at agreement. 
The courts in both Mcinnis and Rodriguez seemed impressed by 
this lack of consensus. 146 At the same time, they appeared to stress 
the notion that education involves weighty issues of social policy, 
encompassing matters of resource allocation as well as of societal 
values with which the courts are neither properly equipped nor 
entitled to deal. 147 Finally, in Rodriguez the claimaints of the right 
to an effective education were thwarted by the Court's rejection of 
the fundamental interest argument. This rejection was doubtlessly 
a double disappointment; it failed to provide a trigger for the 
application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection, and 
it failed to provide the mandate the claimants sought for the sub-
stantive right to an effective education. 
Confronted with these barriers, advocates have scouted a vari-
ety of alternative approaches. One commentator148 sought to keep 
alive the fundamental interest argument by interpreting Mr. Justice 
Powell's remark in Rodriguez 149 regarding the acquisition of 
minimum skills necessary for the exercise of basic constitutional 
rights as an endorsement of the notion of a constitutionally guaran-
teed minimum education. "If this 'minimal' education is seen as 
that minimum amount necessary to the meaningful exercise of first 
amendment rights, then the goal could be set at, for example, an 
exercise at a six th-grade level." 150 Apparently assuming that chil-
dren with .certain handicaps may not be able to attain a prescribed 
level of performance, the writer adds that "one's right is not the 
right to the 'meaningful exercise of first amendment rights' ac-
tualized, but, rather, one's right is the right to approach such an 
-· 
'
45 Perhaps the courts also share in a misunderstanding of the thrust of the argument for 
the substantive right to an effective education. Arguably, the proponents are not seeking 
identical results but rather a guaranteed opportunity for every handicapped child to receive 
an education that is sensitive to the special needs of the handicapped. 
146See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 43 (1972); 
Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
'
47San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 42-43 (1972); Mcinnis 
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
148 Handel, supra note 20, at 355. See also Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education 
for All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1037 (1972). 
149San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 36-37 (1972). 
""Handel, supra note 20, at 355. 
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exercise, i.e., the right to get as far as one is able toward the 
minimum." 151 
Whether this approach overcomes the obstacles noted previ-
ously is questionable, however. For instance, a court would still 
have to decide which skills were required for the meaningful exer-
cise of constitutional rights. Moreover, it would also have to reach 
conclusions on the appropriate pedagogy in the process of deciding 
whether a handicapped child had been accorded ''the right to get as 
far as one is able toward the minimum.'' 
Mindful of the problem of discoverable and manageable judicial 
standards, another recent article analogizes the minimum program 
standards for handicapped children to the core curriculum of the 
schools. 152 A school that failed to develop a program of instruction 
that aimed at developing a degree of proficiency in the basic skills 
of reading, writing, and arithmetic might be said to have failed to 
provide a minimally adequate education for the child under its 
charge. "Since the school is providing or attempting to provide a 
minimally adequate education for regular children, equal protec-
tion requires that they do the same for handicapped children, even 
though the definition of minimally adequate education will differ 
for these children." 153 This would not mean that the adequacy of 
the program for handicapped children would be judged by the same 
substantive standard as would be applied to the nonhandicapped, 
i.e., handicapped children would not necessarily be expected to 
attain the same levels of proficiency. Rather, the school would be 
held responsible for developing a program that addresses the spe-
cial needs of handicapped children in the same fashion that it would 
be held responsible for providing instruction in reading, writing, 
and arithmetic in the general curriculum. 154 
Again, it is doubtful whether this approach solves the problem of 
judicial determination of educational programming. A court must 
still choose the content of the minimum standards it intends to 
enforce. Either it adopts specific achievement or proficiency levels 
as minimal-e.g., all students, handicapped and nonhandicapped, 
must read at the sixth-grade level - or it must determine the kinds 
of pedagogical techniques and educational services that are re-
quired to meet the special needs of handicapped children. Either 
alternative requires the court to make educational policy. 
Another response to the problems encountered in seeking judi-
cial recognition of a substantive right to an adequate and effective 
151/d. (emphasis in original). 
152McClung, supra note 20, at 160. 
1s3/d. 
1s•1d. 
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education has been to pursue "a procedural road to securing a 
minimally adequate education." 155 This approach eschews direct 
efforts to obtain judicial prescription of minimum standards for the 
content of educational programs for handicapped children and asks 
the courts merely to apply the standards of procedural due process 
that have become their special province. To follow this path means 
that "we cannot know for certain whether fair procedure will mean 
an improvement in every child's education." 156 But, 
[w]e can be reasonably sure, however, that such procedures, 
operating in conjunction with the right to some educ.ation, will 
serve as a prophylactic against the worst educati_onal malprac-
tices .... 
. . . At a minimum, the self-analysis forced upon public 
policy-makers, teachers, families, and students by procedural 
fairness in the school classification process insures that schools 
will begin to attend precisely to real rather than imagined 
needs. 157 
The procedural road to adequate education is seen as an effec-
tive means of ove.rcoming judicial restraint in the area of educa-
tional policy. "Judicial action begins and ends with determining 
fair procedure and enforcing the right to some education." 158 
Given the intractability of many of the questions relating to educa-
tional policy, for the purposes of constitutional adjudication "that 
process seems the best way to insure that no child is denied a 
minimally adequate education." 159 
C. The 1975 Act-Pathway to a Substantive 
Right to an Appropriate Education? 
The previous discussion has reviewed the responses to the judi-
cial barriers to recognition of a substantive right of handicapped 
children to an appropriate and effective education. It may be seen 
from that discussion that the problem is less one of constitutional 
rights than one of effective remedies. The courts are loathe to 
define the results which must be achieved by students before a 
school system can be said to provide an appropriate education. The 
Education of All Handicapped Children Act is significant in this 
regard because it contains provisions which may substantially 
1550imond. supra note 22, at 1119. 
1ss1d. 
157/d. (emphasis in original). 
158/d. at 1120 (emphasis in original). 
159/d. Others apparently do not share in that judgment. Handel, supra note 20, at 367, 
explicitly rejects Dimond's contention, while McClung, supra note 20, at 154, feels that 
counsel for handicapped children may find it necessary to resort to the substantive argument 
in many instances where procedural efforts prove unavailing. 
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eliminate the need for judicial definition of educational goals. This 
result is accomplished by permitting educational agencies in coop-
eration with parents of handicapped children to prescribe opera-
tional goals and standards that will be applied in evaluating the 
performance of both the children and the educational agencies. 160 
Moreover, the 1975 Act overcomes the fear of "straightjacketing" 
educational experimentation and innovation that could result from 
the constitutionalizing of program requirements. 161 The provision 
of an administrative complaint and appeal mechanism allays anxi-
ety in this regard .162 Should questions of program adequacy reach 
the courts, the Act structures the issues in familiar and justiciable 
terms. Rather than having to decide whether an educational pro-
gram meets some extrinsic standard of appropriateness and effec-
tiveness, the court needs only to determine whether the educa-
tional agencies have adhered to statutory procedural guidelines and 
whether the agencies have conscientiously endeavored to ac-
complish their self-prescribed educational objectives. 163 
In order to suggest some of the ways in which the provisions of 
the 1975 Act may open the door to more effective advocacy of the 
claim to an appropriate and effective education, the next section of 
this note examines the IEP and complaint procedures in some 
detail. Because the implementation of these provisions may also be 
expected to generate a variety of educational and legal problems, 
Part V explores a number of these issues as they emerge from the 
statutory language. 
V. INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM 
AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
The individualized educational program and procedural 
safeguard requirements of the 1975 Act will influence the shape and 
substance of special education for handicapped children in a vari-
ety of ways. The effects of these provisions on educational agen-
cies and advocates therefore merit careful consideration. 
A. Individualized Educational Program [IEP] 
As a condition of eligibility for receipt of funds under the Act a 
local educational agency must provide assurance that in coopera-
tion with the child's parents or guardians it will establish and revise 
annually a written individualized educational program for each 
160See Part V A infra. 
'"'See note 144 and accompanying text supra. 
•••see Part V B infra. 
'
63See Part V _A and B 3 infra. 
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handicapped child. 164 This written report must set forth the child's 
present performance, short- and long-term instructional objectives, 
objective criteria and procedures for performance evaluation, and 
an evaluation of the progress achieved to date. 165 
This provision is intended to reinforce a general trend in the 
educational community toward individualized instruction, instruc-
tion by objectives, and educational accountability .166 However, 
the greatest significance of the IEP may be the impetus it provides 
for the development of educational programming appropriate to the 
needs of handicapped children. 
By requiring cooperative discussion and agreement on educa-
tional programs and goals, schools and parents are obliged to 
consider the special needs of each handicapped child, which in turn 
should generate pressure for educational programs and facilities 
responsive to those needs. The absence of, or shortcomings in, 
these programs and facilities will predictably be reported to school 
boards, parental advisory groups, and state compliance officers, 167 
thereby increasing the motivation of local and state educational 
agencies to develop and fund a full range of special education 
programs. i 6s 
Additionally, the lii:i,king of individual needs with specific pro-
gram recommendations in the IEP should reduce the incidence of 
functional exclusion_ resulting from the misclassification that leads 
to inappropriate placement and programming. 169 Through indi-
vidualized testing and consultation, followed by individually tail-
ored programs for children needing special education, the condi-
tions that facilitated systematic misclassification and miseducation 
should be substantially reduced. 170 
16420 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975). 
165The 1975 Act defines "individualized educational program" as 
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a 
representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit 
who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed 
instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the 
parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which 
statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational per-
formance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term 
instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be 
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate 
in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and antici-
pated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evalua-
tion procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether 
instructional objectives· are being achieved. 
20 U.S.C. § 1402(19) (Supp. V 1975). 
166See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975). 
167See notes 201-203 and accompanying text infra. 
168See notes 113-114 and accompanying text supra. 
169See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. 
17
°For a discussion of procedural due process that follows a similar train of thought see 
Dimond,_ supra note 22, at 1118-20. 
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Furthermore, the provisions for periodic measurement of per-
formance based on the concrete objectives and operational meas-
ures established in the IEP meeting should make it feasible for 
parents and state compliance personnel to evaluate special educa-
tion programs for appropriateness and effectiveness. 
The major legal significance of the IEP provision is that it facili-
tates the development of judicially manageable standards. The 
performance objectives and measurement criteria are defined by 
the educational agency, relieving the courts of the task of formulat-
ing such standards. The individualization of goals and measures 
should also reduce anxiety about imposing broad, general require-
ments that may inhibit experimentation. Of course, the converse of 
this result is that failure to comply with a specific IEP program is 
not suitable for the kind of class action litigation that characterized 
the struggle against exclusionary practices. 
B. Procedural Safeguards 
Congress inserted a new section171 in the 1975 Act "to clarify 
and strengthen the procedural safeguards in existing law." 172 The 
section pulls together three related elements: procedures for the 
classification and placement of handicapped students; 173 a com-
plaint procedure for parties dissatisfied with any aspect of the 
special education program; 174 and a guarantee of ultimate legal 
recourse. 175 
Although it is ostensibly an effort to clarify and to strengthen 
existing law, 176 the new section goes significantly beyond previous 
legislation in several respects. The procedural provision, buried 
among the state agency requirements in the 1974 Amendments, 177 
is given a place of prominence in the 1975 Act. 178 The complaint 
procedure and the federal cause of action appear for the first time 
in the new legislation. 179 
J. Due Process Guarantees - The procedural safeguards sec-
tion outlines the familiar due process requirements of prior written 
notice, access to pertinent records, explanation of the child's pro-
171 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 197.5). 
172S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1975). The former due process provision had 
been included in the state plan section as a condition of eligibility. 20 U .S.C. § 1413(a)(l3) 
(Supp. IV 1974). 
17320 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A-D) (Supp. V 1975). 
17420 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(l)(E)-1415(e)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
17520 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
176See note 172 and accompanying text supra. 
17720 U .S.C. § 1413(a)(l3) (Supp. IV 1974). 
17820 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b), 1415(d) (Supp. V 1975). 
17920 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(l)(E), !415(b)(2), 1415(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
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cedural rights in the parents' native language, diagnostic and 
placement tests free from cultural bias, and reliance upon more 
than one test or indicator for diagnosis and placement. 180 These 
procedures are required whenever the educational agency pro-
poses to initiate or change, or refuses to initiate or change, the 
identification, evaluation, or placement of the child or refuses to 
provide a free, appropriate, public education to the child. 181 The 
language of the section is far from elegant, 182 but it is nonetheless 
clear that Congress intended to establish procedural requirements 
for all of the critical decisions of identification, classification, and 
placement both before and after the child's entry into the educa-
tional process. 
The efficacy of the due process guarantees may depend to a 
degree upon who initiates the request for classification and place-
ment. Where the school system proposes to test an enrolled child 
for possible placement in a special education program, due process 
protects the child from misclassification and inappropriate educa-
tional programming. 183 But where the child is seeking access to 
special education and the educational agency either refuses admis-
sion or denies placement after testing, the due process guarantees 
may be of limited utility. Unless there is a procedural irregularity 
which can be used to raise doubt about the validity of the classifica-
tion the most elaborate due process guarantees will not assure the 
handicapped child an appropriate educational program. 184 Absent 
18020 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A-D) (Supp. V 1975). See also note 39 and accompanying text 
supra. 
181 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(C) (Supp. V 1975). A separate, detailed set of due process 
guarantees including the right to counsel, to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, 
and to written findings is specified for the complaint procedure, which may be invoked if 
there is dissatisfaction with the evaluation process or placement decision. See 20 U .S.C. § 
1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). See also Part V B 2 infra. 
182The awkward phrasing derives from the fusion of provisions directed at the problem of 
exclusion with provisions applicable to classification and placement. 
18320 U .S.C. §§ 1402(19), 1414(a)(5), 1415(b)(I) and (2) (Supp. V 1975). The 1975 Act in 
effect mandates a two-step procedure for protecting the child against misclassification and 
inappropriate placement. The first stage is comprised of carefully monitored testing coupled 
with parental involvement in the establishment of the IEP. The second stage is prnvision for 
an impartial hearing in the event of parental objection to any facet of the first stage 
proceedings. 
The procedural safeguards section does not address the question of what happens if the 
parents of a handicapped child refuse to consent to evaluation or placement. These matters 
are also considered briefly at note 207, infra. However, the proposed regulations attempt to 
clarify this matter by providing that "[a] meeting may be conducted without a parent in 
attendance if the local educational agency is unable to convince the parents that they should 
attend. In this case the local educational agency must have a record of its attempts to 
arrange a mutually agreed on [sic] time and place, ... " Proposed Regulations, § 
12la.224(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 56,986 (1976). On the other hand, the proposed regulations also 
expressly require parental consent to an evaluation before it may be conducted. Proposed 
Regulations, § 12la.404(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976). 
184On the other hand, a careful evaluation of the educational needs of the child who 
requests access to special education undoubtedly maximizes the probability of proper 
classification. Assuring the availability of this type of evaluation may be the most important 
effect of the due process guarantees. See Dimond, supra note 22, at 1119. 
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a procedural irregularity, the interests of the child can be protected 
in an instance of agency denial of admission or placement only if 
the decision is opened to examination and challenge. Doubtless it 
was this realization that prompted congressional 'sponsors to add a 
complaint procedure to the 1975 Act. 18~ • 
2. Complaint Procedure - Any educational agency seeking fed-
eral assistance under the Act is required to provide "an opportun-
ity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or 
the provision of a free appropriate public education to such 
child." 186 This provision is critical because it invites complaints 
not only on the matters of access and classification which have 
dominated the agendas of advocates and courts to date, but also on 
matters of appropriateness and accountability. 187 
Section 1415 also details the rights and duties associated with the 
processing of the complaint. The complainant is entitled to a hear-
ing conducted by the appropriate educational agency before an 
impartial hearing officer who is not an employee of the agency .188 
The complainant has a right to appeal the findings or decision of the 
hearing' officer to the state educational agency .189 In the hearing 
the parties have the right to counsel; to present evidence; toques-
tion, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; to a 
verbatim record; and to a written statement of findings. 190 
3. Effec'ts of the Complaint Procedure - The complaint proce-
dure should strengthen compliance by calling alleged violations of 
185The House version of the bill, H.R. 7217, contained a separate section(§ 617) which 
required each state to establish a grievance procedure. Neither the Senate bill (S. 6) nor 
previous legislation provided a clear indication of the recourse available to children 
excluded from special education programs. The Conference Committee agreed to the incor-
poration of most of the House bill's grievance procedure into the final version of the Act as 
part of a new "Procedural Safeguards" section. s: REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 
(1975). 
18620 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(I)(E) (Supp. V 1975). 
187There can be no doubt as to the intended breadth of this provision. In the words of 
Senator Williams, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare: 
I would like to stress that the language referring to "free appropriate public 
education" [in the clauses providing for parental complaints] has been adopted to 
make clear that a complaint may involve matters such as questions respecting a 
child's individualized educational program, questions of whether special education 
and related services are being provided without charge to the parents of [sic J 
guardians, questions relating to whether the services provided a child meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, or any other question within the scope 
of the definition of "free appropriate public education." In addition, it should be 
clear that a parent or guardian may present a complaint alleging that a State or local 
educational agency has refused to provide services to which a child may be entitled 
[or) alleging that the State or local educational agency has erroneously classified a 
child as a handicapped child when, in fact, that child is not a handicapped child. 
121 CONG. REc. S20,432 (daily ed. November 19, 1975). 
Because of its broad significance, this provision receives extended treatment in Part VB 3 
infra. 
18820 U .S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(Supp. V 1975). See notes 192-203 and accompanying text infra. 
18920 U .S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
19020 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (Supp. V 1975). 
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state and local plans to the attention of the state educational agency 
and the Commissioner of Education, both of which have the au-
thority to withhold funds for noncompliance. 191 
Less obvious perhaps is the influence of the complaint provision 
on the framing of issues. The statute requires the complaint to be 
heard before an impartial hearing officer who is not an employee of 
the educational agency involved in the education or care of the 
child. 192 The method of selection of the hearing officer is not 
discussed in the I 975 Act. Presumably it is left to state and local 
procedures. 193 Nor is the precise authority of the hearing officer 
revealed by the statutory language. Evidently he is expected to 
conduct an adversary hearing in which the representatives of the 
handicapped child may cross-examine the educational and testing 
personnel and present expert witnesses. 194 Since the complaint 
may encompass "the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
education to such child," 195 the hearing officer has the implicit 
authority to render decisions on any of these matters. 196 
Complaints by parents of handicapped children may challenge 
the decisions of the educational agency or the adequacy of the 
educational program. With respect to agency decisions the com-
plaint may either challenge the procedures used in the identifica-
tion, evaluation, and placement of the child, or the result of these 
procedures - the substantive decisic,n to classify and place the 
child in one program or another. Procedural challenges are perhaps 
the most amenable to review. The list of procedural rights recog-
nized by the courts has been articulated in the 1975 Act as a 
condition for receipt of federal funds. By examining witnesses and 
191Consider the interrelation between 20 U.S.C. §§ J415(d), 1413(a)(l2), l4l4(b)(2), and 
20 U.S.C. § 1418 (Supp. V 1975). See also note 22 and accompanying text infra. 
19220 U.S.C. § 14l5(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1975). 
1938111 see note 197 infra. 
194The Act does not specify the modus operandi of the hearing, presumably leaving this 
matter to the states. However, the Act does require the states to grant the parties various 
rights-to counsel, to present evidence, to examine and cross-examine withesses, to a 
verbatim record, and to written findings-which have the effect of mandating a trial-type 
proceeding. See 20 U.S.C § l4l5(d) (Supp. V 1975). 
The proposed regulations are silent regarding the procedural contours of the complaint 
hearing. See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976). 
19520 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (Supp. V 1975). 
'""The Conference Report states that "language is adopted to assure that: (a) any parent 
or guardian may present a complaint concerning any matter regarding the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such a child." S. REP. No. 455. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1975) 
(emphasis in original). 
It is uncertain whether the sweeping authority that the drafters have apparently conferred 
upon the hearing officer represents an abiding faith in the adversary process or merely a 
failure to consider fully the implications of the provisions they have drafted. One suspects a 
preoccupation with providing a mechanism to combat exclusionary practices and with 
guaranteeing procedural due process in testing and placement decisions. 
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producing expert testimony the complainant may demonstrate that 
his p_rocedural rights have been denied. The effect of this demon-
stration is not clear, however. Presumably, the hearing officer may 
order the retesting of the child, or on the basis of the substantive 
evidence presented he may order placement in a specific pro-
gram.191 
Substantive challenges are more problematic. When the place-
ment choice of the educational agency is challenged by the com-
plainant, the alternatives for the hearing officer are to order retesting 
or to place the child, whether by endorsing the agency's choice or 
by making a new disposition. In the latter instance the hearing 
officer-substitutes his judgment for that of the educational agency's 
personnel. Despite possible reservations about placing this deci-
sion in the hands of a lay person 198 the interests of the educational 
agency and of the child are protected in some measure by the 
opportunity to appeal the decision to the state educational agency 
and to the courts. 199 
It is more difficult to assess the events that would follow the 
submission of a complaint questioning the appropriateness or 
adequacy of an educational program in which a handicapped child 
is enrolled. A dispute might arise between the child or his parents 
and the educational agency concerning the objectives to be pur-
sued in the individualized educational program. In resolving this 
197This po·wer raises an intriguing question as to the qualifications of the hearing officer. 
The statute makes no mention of qualifications, except that the person may not be an 
employee of the agency charged with the education or care of the child. 20 U .S.C. § 
1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). May he (or must he) be a person familiar with the education of 
handicapped children, for example, a special education consultant? If so, the complainant 
may suspect that his decision will be biased in favor of his professional colleagues in the 
educational agency. Yet, ifhe is a layman, he may be asked to make a difficult placement 
decision based upon technical data with which he lacks a working familiarity. 
The Council for Exceptional Children has apparently opted for expertise. In an article that 
excerpts portions of the Council's publication, A Primer on Due Process, a number of 
recommendations are made regarding the selection of hearing officers for the type of 
"impartial due process hearing" mandated by the 1975 Act. One of the recommendations 
reads: "Individuals selected should: ... 2. Possess special knowledge, acquired through 
training and/or experience, about the nature and needs of exceptional children. An aware-
ness and understanding of the types and quality of programs that are available at any time for 
exceptional children is essential." Abeson, Bolick & Haas, A Primer on Due Process: 
Education Decisions for Handicapped Children, 42 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 68, 72-73 
(1975). 
The proposed regulations add to the uncertainty regarding the hearing officer's qualifica-
tions by providing that "[a] hearing must not be conducted: ... [b]y any person having a 
personal or professional interest which would conflict with his or her objectivity in the 
hearing." Proposed Regulations, § 12 la.407(a)(2) 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976). Is an expert on 
the education of handicapped children barred by this provision from serving as a hearing 
officer? Or is professional training sufficient insulation against loss of objectivity? One may 
only hope that the final regulations will further clarify the eligibility requirements for hearing 
officers. 
198See note 197 supra. 
199See Part V B 4 infra. 
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dispute the hearing officer would be obliged to set forth the educa-
tional goals which the child and the agency are expected to 
achieve. A profound faith in the adversary process is required to 
believe that this procedure win assure the handicapped child an 
appropriate education. 
Where the adequacy of the funding, personnel, or curriculum of 
the educational program is the target of the complaint, the hearing 
must address issues that are more complex than the investigation 
of procedural irregularities or the selection of an appropriate edu-
cational program. Having observed the hesitancy of the judiciary 
to tackle questions of funding and programming, 200 one may an-
ticipate a hearing officer will be similarly trepidacious. Thus, the 
primary importance of the hearing in this context may be to trigger 
program review by state and federal officials since the 1975 Act 
requires that the findings and decision of the hearing officer be 
transmitted to the state advisory paneI. 201 The advisory panel is 
charged with the duty to advise the state educational agency of 
unmet needs within the state and to assist the state in reporting 
developments to the Commissioner of Education. 202 In other 
words, the l}earing may function primarily to draw administrative 
attention to the substantive issues of appropriate and adequate 
programming. 203 
The adversarial nature of the complaint hearing should also be 
taken into account in assessing the impact of the 1975 Act's com-
plaint provision. Unlike the decrees in P.A.R.C. and Mills, 204 the 
1975 Act is silent on the allocation of the burden of proof in the 
hearing. Yet the practical significance of this matter renders it 
advisable to speculate briefly on how this allocation may be made. 
Ostensibly, where an educational agency has initiated a change 
in educational status, it may be required under traditional adminis-
trative law principles to carry the burdens of production and per-
suasion. 205 Similarly, where a school system rejects a parental 
request to enroll a child in a special education program, the school 
may have to justify its decision. If a procedural irregularity can be 
found, the burden of production may be shifted to the agency to 
defend its actions. Nevertheless, in the absence of an express 
mandate in state education or administrative law it is difficult to 
suppose that even in these circumstances the decision of the educa-
200See notes 126-147 and accompanying text supra. 
201 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975). 
20220 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(l2) (Supp. V 1975). 
203 For persons who are pessimistic about the efficacy of administrative solutions, the 1975 
Act also provides for eventual judicial review of the complaint. See Part V B 5 infra. 
•••see note 39 supra. 
205See, e.g., The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970); K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 287 (3d ed. 1972). 
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tional agency will not carry a presumption of validity that will 
effectively place the production- and persuasion-burdens on the 
complainant. 
Situations may be hypothesized in which at a minimum the 
production-burden would be shifted one way or another, but one 
suspects that a hearing officer will seldom require an educational 
agency to establish the validity of a challenged placement decision 
or educational program without first requiring the complainant to 
show that the procedural guidelines were violated or that the agen-
cy's decision was probably in error. And regardless of where the 
burden of persuasion is formally placed, the complainant will un-
doubtedly have to overcome the presumption of validity that at-
taches to the judgments of the educational experts. 206 
While the format of the complaint hearing may be expected to 
channel disputes in predictable ways, the very existence of a com-
plaint and hearing procedure will influence the provision of educa-
tional services for handicapped children. The complaint and hear-
ing procedure serves to bestow legitimacy upon. the position of the 
complainant. Recognizing the right of the parents of a handicapped 
child to enter a complaint necessarily implies that the needs and 
opinions of the child and his parents are entitled to the fullest 
consideration. This recognition does not necessarily mean that 
educational agencies have been insensitive to these matters, only 
that the child's position is elevated from that of beneficiary to that 
of co-decisionmaker. Depending upon the degree of objectivity of 
parents of handicapped children, results may range from increased 
parental awareness and involvement to the chaos borne of inces-
sant complaints that may yield educational practices akin to "de-
fensive medicine. " 207 
206 Handel has outlined the pendular shifts in the burden of production which may be 
anticipated when challenging the adequacy of an.educational program. He also notes that the 
burden of persuasion falls upon the complainant to show that despite adherence to profes-
sional standards the child has not received an adequate education. See Handel, supra note 
20. • 
201Regarding the pivotal role of the parents in the struggle for recognition of the educa-
tional rights of handicapped children, one writer has observed that 
deeply rooted in our legal and sociological heritage is the position that parents are 
the natural guardians of their children. Implicit in such a position is the belief that 
there is an identity or, at least, compatibility of interest between the parent and the 
child as well as a capability on the part of the parent to care for and deal with the 
child and represent him in his dealings with society's institutions. However, the 
time may have come to challenge this fundamental assumption. 
Murdock, Cil'i/ Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 133, 137 (1972). 
Insufficient attention has been given to the legal problems created by disbelieving or 
recalcitrant parents. This lack of attention is perhaps understandable in view of the leading 
role taken by parents in the legal struggle for educational rights of the handicapped. Whether 
the elaborate procedural safeguards mandated in the 1975 Act will protect the interests of a 
handicapped child where the parents refuse to permit the child to be enrolled in a special 
education program is questionable. Conceivably, an educational agency may use the com-
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The effect of the interplay of the complaint and hearing, the 
mandated due process procedures, and the goals of appropriate 
and adequate educational programming should also be noted. The 
complaint and hearing provisions reinforce the guarantees of 
adequate, unbiased testing and placement and of individualized 
educational _programming. Provision for a complaint and hearing 
means that failure to comply with the due process and IEP re-
quirements will come to the attention of persons with the power to 
compel performance by withholding funds. 208 More importantly, 
perhaps, educational personnel are motivated to exercise their best 
professional judgments by an awareness that their decisions must 
withstand scrutiny by their peers and by those who review com-
plaints. The impact of this factor cannot be measured in terms of 
individualized complaints resolved, but its significance for the 
overall quality of the educational program should not be underes-
timated. 
4. Appeal to the State Educational Agency - "[A]ny party 
aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered [by the hearing 
officer] may appeal to the State educational agency .... " 209 In 
contrast with the complaint hearing where the opportunity to pre-
sent a complaint is accorded only to "the parents or guardian," 210 
an administrative appeal may be taken either by the parents or 
guardian or by the local educational agency. 211 The state educa-
plaint procedure to force a hearing on the placement of a child that the agency believes to be 
handicapped where the parents refuse to sanction placement. However, where state or local 
procedures require parental consent before any testing or evaluation may take place, it is not 
clear whether the complaint procedure would be available to the educational agency. 
The proposed regulations permit an IEP meeting without parental involvement, but forbid 
evaluation of a child suspected of manifesting a handicap without parental consent. See note 
183 supra. 
268See note 191 and accompanying text supra. 
20920 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
21
°20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). But see Proposed Regulations,§ 12la.406(a), 41 
Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976), which states that "[a] parent or a local educational agency may 
initiate a hearing on any of the matters described in § 121a.404(a)(I) and (2)." The latter 
regulation rephrases 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(C), (D) (Supp. V 1975) pertaining to proposals to 
initiate, change, or deny evaluation, placement, or programming for a handicapped child. 
See Part V 8 2 supra. 
211 The right of appeal is restricted to an aggrieved party. What constitutes an aggrieved 
party is not indicated. Absent such an indication, virtually any dissatisfaction with the 
decision of the hearing officer is presumably sufficient justification for administrative ap-
peal. 
A more difficult question of standing to appeal would be presented by the request for 
administrative review brought by a public interest association that seeks to represent 
handicapped children. Historically, organizations such as the Pennsylvania Association for 
Retarded Children have been instrumental in obtaining judicial recognition of the education 
rights of handicapped children. The goals of an association seeking participation in order to 
represent the interests of a handicapped child may conflict at times with those of the parents 
of the handicapped child. A situation may be imagined in which the parents of children on 
whose behalf the complaint was entered have decided to accept the hearing officer's 
disposition despite the association's objection. The association may believe that the decision 
was incorrect or that the findings of the hearing officer have broader ramifications that will 
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tional agency is required to conduct an "impartial review" 212 of 
the prior hearing. 213 "The officer conducting such review shall 
make an independent decision upon completion of such re-
view. "214 
The scope of review is not clear from the statutory language. 
However, there are two basic possibilities; an independent decision 
based upon review of the record below or a de novo hearing. The 
Act is ambiguous in that it refers to a state agency review of the 
prior hearing, which implies that the hearing below is to be the 
point of departure, yet it also grants the same due process rights as 
at the first hearing, including the rights to present evidence and to 
confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, 
thereby implying more than mere record review. 215 
The legislative history does not remove the ambiguity. 
It is not intended that the review conducted by the state educa-
tional agency must necessarily be a de novo review although the 
reviewing officer should carefully examine the entire record of 
the hearing, afford parties an opportunity for oral argument, 
and assure that the procedures followed at the hearing were 
consistent with due process. 216 
The impl_ication from the Senate floor debate is that the reviewing 
officer has an option to choose the mode of review, albeit with the 
assurance of an opportunity for aggrieved parties to present an oral 
argument. 217 
On the other hand, the nature of the review hearing will often be 
governed by the nature of the issues raised. A due process com-
plaint may be resolved on the basis of the record below, while a 
be detrimental to the interests of other handicapped children. Under such circumstances it is 
unclear whether the association has or should have the right of appeal. 
The complexities of the standing doctrine cannot be unraveled here. On recent develop-
ments in the administrative area see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES. 
289-95. 485-528 (1976). However. with respect to the situation hypothesized in the foregoing 
paragraph one point merits discussion. The notion that a third party should be allowed to 
press an appeal in the face of opposition by the parents or guardian of the child may seem 
inconsistent with basic jurisprudence. Yet all too frequently the comfortable assumption 
that the parents necessarily share an identity of interest with their handicapped child may 
not be empirically defensible. See Murdock, supra note 207. If the child is truly the 
~ggrieved party. then on some occasions his interest may be better served by permitting a 
third party to appeal. 
21220 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
213The Act does not discuss the qualifications of the reviewing officer. Presumably the 
reviewing officer will be an official of the state department of education. 
21420 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
21520 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (Supp. V 1975). 
216 121 CONG. REc. S20.433 (daily ed. Nov. 19. 1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
217The Act specifies neither the standard of review to be applied by the reviewing officer, 
nor the intended scope of review. The proposed regulations shed no light on these matters 
either. 
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question of program adequacy may require a de novo hearing at 
which the policy questions that necessarily surround such matters 
may be fully ventilated. 218 Questions of placement appear to fall 
into a grey area between the two extremes since it may be possible 
to resolve them on the basis of written evaluations and affidavits, 
yet they may also involve matters of educational policy and pro-
gram capabilities. 
Perhaps the most that can be said with certainty regarding state 
agency review is that the guarantee of due process safeguards 
presses in the direction of a trial-type hearing and that the review-
ing officer is required to make an independent judgment. Since the 
Act does not restrict the reviewing officer to a decision based upon 
evidence in the record, it may be expected that he will conduct a 
wide-ranging inquiry whenever it is necessary for him to take 
account of broader issues of educational policy in rendering his 
decision. 
The relationship between state agency review and the statutory 
compliance machinery must also be considered. The 1975 Act 
requires a state agency in carrying out its responsibilities for 
screening local agency applications to "consider any decision 
made pursuant to a hearing held under [section 1415] which is 
adverse to the local educational agency or intermediate educational 
unit involved in such decision. " 219 The local agencies may be 
expected to contest vigorously any decision of a hearing officer 
that casts doubts on local compliance. 220 However, the Act re-
quires the state to provide a local agency with the opportunity for a 
hearing before the state may find a violation. 221 
5. Judicial Review of the Complaint Process - Congress was 
not content to rely upon the administrative appeal procedure to 
protect the interests of handicapped children. It also offered any 
aggrieved party "the right to bring a civil action with respect to the 
complaint presented pursuant to this section ... in any State court 
of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States 
without regard to the amount in controversy. " 222 Again, it is un-
clear whether the scope of the judicial review contemplated by the 
statute calls for appellate review of an adjudicatory proceeding or 
for a de novo judicial determination of the dispute. However,~the 
statute provides some hints of the legislative intent. The right to 
bring a civil action is granted to parties aggrieved by the findings 
218State agency review may be the best forum to consider the broader policy dimensions 
of programming and placement oecause of the presumed access of state officials to the 
requisite data and reports. 
21920 U .S.C. § 1414(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975). 
220Similarly. the local agency may be expected to press for judicial review of the state 
review proceedings. See Part V B 5 infra. 
22
'20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975). 
22220 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V. 1975). 
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and decision of either the initial hearing or the state agency re-
view. 223 Furthermore, the court is instructed to "receive the rec-
ords of the administrative proceedings .... " 224 These references, 
together with the placement of the civil action provision within the 
procedural safeguards section, 225 suggest that the court is expected 
to undertake the more limited appellate review of the agency deci-
sion, rather than a de novo review. 
However, these indicia are balanced by others which suggest a 
more expansive judicial role. The grant of a right to bring a civil 
action is expressly linked to the "complaint presented pursuant to 
this section" 226 rather than to the decision of the hearing or review 
officer. This language is echoed in the Conference Report which 
specifically provides that the aggrieved party's right to bring a civil 
action extends "to the original complaint and matters relating 
thereto. " 227 Further, the court is instructed to hear additional 
evidence at the request of a party and to "grant such relief as the 
court determines is appropriate. " 228 These elements evidence an 
intention to accord aggrieved parties the opportunity to receive a 
de novo judicial determination on the merits of the dispute. 
On balance, it seems that the Act allows a court to undertake a 
broad review of the disputed issues of placement and programming 
as well as a review of the prior administrative proceedings in which 
these issues have been considered and decided. 
The prospective involvement of the judiciary in the determina-
tion of issues of educational placement and programming suggests 
two points for brief consideration. The first involves the doctrine of 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 229 The sequence to be 
22320 U.S.C. ·§ 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
22•1d. 
225The paragraph that recognizes the right of civil action is preceded by a paragraph that 
declares that the decision of the hearing or review officer shall be final, "except that any 
party involved in such hearing may appeal such decision under the provisions" for state 
agency review or right of civil action. 20 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(I) (Supp. V 1975). The proposed 
regulations are silent with regard to the scope of judicial review. 
22620 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
227S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975). 
22820 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
229This doctrinal label is applied because from a common sense perspective the core issue 
is whether an aggrieved party will be required to follow the channels of administrative 
review before the court will entertain a challenge to local or state agency determination. This 
question seems to be one of timing, i.e., when the court will review the agency action. Thus, 
the exhaustion doctrine should be applied. See K. DAVIS, AoMINSTRATIVE LAw TEXT 373 
(3d ed. 1972). However, the framework of the procedural safeguards section suggests 
another possibility. Even if the statutory language which confers a right of civil action upon 
an aggrieved party is read to apply only after an initial complaint has been made to·the local 
agency and after a hearing has been held, a disgruntled parent may try to bring a civil action 
regarding the initial placement determination in lieu of invoking the complaint procedure. In 
this situation, the threshold question before the court would be whether it should apply the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction and require an agency to consider the substance of the 
complaint before the court will hear the complaint. See id. Presumably, the policy consider-
ations are similar, but the distinction illustrates further the ambiguities contained in the 
provision of the Act granting a right to bring a civil action. · 
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followed in obtaining review of a local agency's placement or 
programming decision in the typical case seems clear. The parent 
or guardian enters a complaint and receives a hearing. If there is 
dissatisfaction with the outcome, an administrative review is ob-
tained. The right of civil action is involved only after the adminis-
trative review is completed. 230 
However, the parents or guardian may wish to short-circuit this' 
procedure, particularly if the purpose is to establish a precedent 
regarding the education of handicapped children rather than simply 
to challenge a placement decision. 231 This purpose may be ac-
complished without reference to the right of civil action conferred 
by the 1975 Act. 232 Alternatively, the potential plaintiffs may seek 
to avail themselves of the statute's right of civil action. In either 
case the court must decide whether to apply the exhaustion 
doctrine. Several reasons may be advanced in favor of its applica-
tion. 
Perhaps the most obvious reason for requiring exhaustion is that 
the issues may be resolved within the administrative framework 
without the need for judicial involvement, particularly where the 
complaint involves procedural matters. Since the procedural re-
quirements have been set forth in detail, an administrative officer 
will be able to determine compliance in most cases. Where sub-
230That the parties are required to follow these steps may be inferred from the statutory 
language: 
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (b) [the 
complaint-hearing provision] who does not have the right to an appeal under 
subsection (c) of this section [the state review hearing]. and any party aggrieved by 
the findings and decision under subsection (c) of this section, shall have the right to 
bring a civil action with respect to the complaint .... 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). This language seems to require the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies except for the party prevailing at the complaint hearing. 
23
'For example, in a recent Pennsylvania case, Fialkowski v. Shapp. 405 F. Supp. 946 
(E.D. Pa. 1975). the parents of two severely mentally retarded children claimed that the 
children were denied equal protection because the local and state school officials failed to 
provide them with an appropriate education. While the plaintiffs were seeking monetary 
damages, the complaint in substance raised the issues of whether the state was required to 
provide each child with an education appropriate to the child's needs and whether the 
program provided was adequate. 
232 Among the possibilities not further discussed in this Note are: 
(I) A constitutional claim of violation of equal protection. 
(2) An action in the nature of mandamus against the Commissioner of Education requiring 
him to withhold funds under the terms of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act. 20 
U .S.C. § 1416(a) (Supp. V I 975). or against the state and local educational agencies that are 
recipients of funds under the 1975 Act to obtain compliance with the congressional require-
ments. (See K. DAVIS, supra note 229. at 447-51. See also Tomlinson & Mashaw, The 
Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary 
lnl'Olvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600. 630-37 (1972)). 
(3) An implied right of action as beneficiary of the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act against the state and local educational agencies claiming a violation of the terms and 
conditions of the Act. See. e.g., Mattie T. v. Johnston, No. DC-75-31-S (N.D. Miss .. filed 
April 25, 1975), noted in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. I 13 (1975). 
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stantive issues of appropriateness of education and program 
adequacy are involved, there may be less prospect for effective 
resolution on the administrative level, but considerations of effi-
ciency still indicate that administrative review should be attempted 
first. Indeed, where educational programming is at the center of the 
conflict, one may expect that a court will welcome the input of 
state education officials in addition to a full development of the 
record. Nor should a court be expected to overlook the panoply of 
procedural safeguards mandated in the 1975 Act, including the 
right of civil action, which was installed to achieve compliance by 
means of administrative supervision. 233 A premature consideration 
of the complex issues of educational placement and programming 
would waste judicial resources. 
However, a court should not automatically refrain from hearing 
a complaint concerning placement or programming until all ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted. There may be occa-
sions when administrative recourse would be futile. 234 On those 
occasions the court should not apply the exhaustion doctrine. 235 
There may be other occasions when the issues call for judicial 
decision without regard to the possibility of administrative review, 
for example, where the exclusion of a handicapped child from the 
educational system is allegedly based upon a state administrative 
interpretation of statutory language. 
Notwithstanding the potential application of the exhaustion doc-
trine, the effect of the civil action provision will be to involve the 
courts more deeply in the formulation and execution of educational 
policy, providing an ironic twist to the implications of the 1975 Act. 
It was suggested previously236 that one effect of the IEP would be 
to relieve the courts of the task of formulating educational policy 
and standards of performance in actions involving education of the 
handicapped to the extent that the written individualized educa-
tional programs will spell out educational objectives and perform-
233See notes 201-203 and accompanying text supra. 
234See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975), wherein the plaintiffs 
contended that the review procedures adopted by Pennsylvania after the P.A.R.C. decision 
were inadequate to address the issue of appropriate education raised by the plaintiffs. 
Apparently the state Secretary of Education reyiewed only the procedures involved in the 
initial hearing and whether the evidence presented by the school personnel justified the 
classification made. The district court all but endorsed the notion that unless the review 
procedures permitted review of the substance of complaints regarding the inadequacy or 
inappropriateness of the educational programs, they did not afford an adequate administra-
tive remedy. 405 F. Supp. at 957. 
235 l n reviewing the Conference Report on the floor of the Senate one sponsor informed his 
colleagues that exhaustion of the administrative procedures should not be required where 
such action "would be futile either as a legal or practical matter." 121 CONG. REC. S20,433 
(daily ed. Nov. 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
236See Part V A supra. 
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ance measures. One conclusion that may be drawn for the pres-
ent discussion of the complaint and civil action provisions is that 
they will operate at cross purposes with the IEP in this regard. 
While the courts may be able to glean manageable judicial stan-
dards from the individualized educational programs, thereby avoid-
ing the need to set educational objectives, they may be called upon 
more frequently to decide whether the programs provided by edu-
cational agencies are appropriate to the needs of handicapped 
children and are being carried out effectively. 
Another effect of increased judicial participation may be con-
templated with restrained enthusiasm. One unfortunate prospect of 
the establishment of individualized educational programs is the 
possibility of harassment and unrealistic demands by parents dis-
satisfied with their child's special education program and the re-
sults obtained thereby. For example, the provision for indi-
vidualized educational programs may blur the distinction between 
reasonable objectives and attainment. Many ingredients must be 
combined to produce a successful education experience. Yet the 
IEP may encourage dissatisfied parents to blame the educational 
personnel or the lack of equipment or other supporting services 
when the projected goals are not met. Of course, such criticism 
may be deserved. Yet, it must be wondered whether the educa-
tional needs of handicapped children can be adequately served 
should agency personnel find themselves devoting a significant 
portion of their time to preparing for and participating in adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings. The legacy of the procedural 
safeguards provision of the 1975 Act may be the development of 
educational programs that are more attuned to the legal system's 
need for enforceable legal standards than to the complex needs of 
handicapped children. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Senator Harrison Williams, the chief Senatorial sponsor of the 
Education of All Handicapped Children Act, described it as "the 
most important Federal legislation affecting American public edu-
cation since the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965. " 237 An assessment of the accuracy of this 
prediction will require many years. However, it is not too soon to 
draw a number of conclusions regarding this legislation. 
237 121 CONG. REC. S20,430 (daily ed. Nov. 19. 1975). 
152 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:110 
The 1975 Act may be expected to shape programs of education 
for handicapped children in at least three ways. The prospect of 
federal aid to assist in meeting the costs of educating handicapped 
children, coupled with the eligibility deadlines imposed, will speed 
implementation of education programs designed to meet the special 
needs of all handicapped children in the United States. Although 
the promise of large-scale federal financial support may prove 
illusory, the commitment to support the direct costs of special 
education will provide proponents with significant leverage when 
seeking larger sums in the future. In addition the IEP and pro-
cedural safeguards provisions will undoubtedly influence the form 
and substance of education for the handicapped in ways ranging 
from individualized educational programming to state administra-
tive scrutiny of program quality and performance. 
The 1975 Act also promises to reshape litigation in this area in a 
variety of ways. Although constitutional claims will continue to 
challenge exclusionary practices, the emphasis should shift toward 
the issue of the child's substantive right to an appropriate and 
effective education. The Act's provisions establishing placement 
procedures, complaints and judicial review will channel more dis-
putes over placement and program performance into the courts. 
Despite the Act's prescription of administrative review, the courts 
may be expected to become more intimately involved in piacement 
and programming determinations as a result of this legislation. 
Perhaps the most notable implication of the 1975 Act, however, 
is its role as a symbol of a changing attitude toward handicapped 
persons, for the Act represents the commitment of the nation to 
equal educational opportunity as a birthright for all handicapped 
children. 
-Donald W. Keim 
